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This paper introduces habit formation into an otherwise standard model of international
trade.  Household tastes evolve over time to favor foods consumed as a child.  The opening of
trade causes preferred goods to rise in price, as these were relatively inexpensive in autarky. 
Neglecting the correlation between tastes and agro-climatic endowments overstates the short-run
nutritional gains from agricultural trade liberalization and masks potential caloric losses for
laborers.  I examine the predictions of this model of trade with habit formation using household
survey data from India, both by looking across Indian regions and by examining the consumption
patterns of inter-state migrants.
JEL Codes: O10, O12, Q17, F10
Keywords: International Trade, Habit Formation, India, Tastes, Nutrition1 Introduction
The impacts of agricultural trade on the developing world are of great interest to economists
and policymakers alike. For example, the Doha round of global trade negotiations aims to
both substantially liberalize agricultural trade and ensure that trade brings greater beneﬁts
to developing countries. At the same time, surging demand from emerging markets has
pushed up the traded prices of many food crops. Even in food-exporting countries, policy-
makers have raised concern about the potentially adverse eﬀects of these price changes on cer-
tain consumers. In this paper, I explore a new channel which provides a more complete under-
standing of the nutritional impacts of agricultural trade on the poor through examining the
role of tastes in international trade, a subject that has been neglected in the literature to date.
Standard international trade theory typically focuses on the production side, rather than
the consumption side, and assumes that preferences are identical across regions and inde-
pendent of resource endowments.1 This paper explores the consequences of relaxing this
assumption in a very natural way. I incorporate habit formation into an overlapping genera-
tions model of trade and demonstrate that this leads to regional food tastes that favor crops
relatively well-suited to local agro-climatic endowments. This correlation between tastes and
endowments systematically reduces the short-run nutritional gains from trade compared to
models without habit formation. Using household consumption data from regions within
India, I provide two sets of empirical evidence that support the model’s predictions and I
quantify the extent to which regional taste diﬀerences will alter the nutritional impact of
trade if India were to liberalize its highly restricted internal agricultural markets.
In particular, I deﬁne tastes for food as the component of the food budget share that
cannot be explained by the vector of prices or total food expenditure in a demand system.
Based on extensive evidence in the nutrition literature, surveyed in Birch (1999), I assume
that adult tastes favor the foods consumed as a child and term this process habit formation.
1International trade textbooks mention that taste diﬀerences can be one source of comparative advan-
tage, however the literature dealing with cross-country taste diﬀerences only explores the consequences of
non-homothetic preferences, for example Hunter and Markusen (1987) or more recently Fieler (2009).
1While large literatures explore the implications of habit formation for demand, asset pricing,
monetary policy, growth and addiction, this paper is, as far as I am aware, the ﬁrst explo-
ration of how habit formation in consumption alters standard models of international trade.
The ﬁrst generation of adults, who value only calories and dietary variety, purchase large
quantities of a region’s relatively abundant (comparative advantage) agricultural goods, as
these foods are relatively cheap under autarky. Their children are fed these locally abun-
dant foods, and develop particular tastes for them in adulthood. Over many generations, a
home bias in household consumption emerges endogenously through habit formation. The
same aﬃnities for local foods emerge if recipes and preparation techniques improve faster
for commonly consumed foods. Households will choose to purchase the familiar local foods
that they know how to transform into high-quality meals.
At the time of trade liberalization, the preferred foods rise in price in each region as these
foods were relatively inexpensive in autarky, and trade equalizes prices across regions. Con-
sumers spend a large portion of their incomes on these favored foods and are reluctant to sub-
stitute out of them and into less familiar imports, which reduces the consumption gains from
trade compared to a model without habit formation. Only decades after trade liberalization
can consumers realize the full caloric gains from trade, as food tastes gradually adapt, eventu-
ally resulting in even larger caloric gains than a model without habit formation would predict.
The aggregate production gains from trade also shrink with habit formation because habits
reduce the autarky relative price diﬀerences between regions.2 As in a standard trade model,
these reduced production gains will be distributed unevenly. If labor is mobile and combined
with crop-speciﬁc land to produce a food, the speciﬁc factors model implies that labor’s nom-
inal wage gains from trade will be strictly smaller than the price rise in the locally abundant
food. Therefore, although there are still aggregate caloric gains from trade in this model—
albeit smaller than the gains in a standard trade model—trade can spell short-run nutritional
losses for landless laborers. This is because habit formation results in this group spending a
2Habit formation has allowed each region to exploit some of the gains from specialization in previous
generations, thereby reducing the production gains possible at the moment of trade liberalization.
2large portion of their budget on the local staple whose price rises more than their income.3
The recent surge in world food prices provides supportive evidence of this link between
tastes, trade and nutrition. In March 2006, Argentina banned all exports of beef in order
to lower the domestic price for beef-loving Argentinians. In 2008, Vietnam, Cambodia and
Egypt banned rice exports; Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine banned wheat exports; while
Zambia and Malawi banned maize exports. In all of these cases, important agricultural
exports are the preferred calorie sources of low-income households. Trade-induced price
rises increased hunger among poor consumers, and governments explicitly tried to help this
group by restricting trade and bringing prices of favored foods back towards autarky levels.
In contrast, a standard trade model without habit formation would recommend transferring
income from exporters, and allowing poor consumers to substitute into relatively cheap foods.
I test my theory more directly by using detailed household survey data from India. India
contains many agro-climatic zones and extremely varied diets. At the same time, India main-
tains extensive internal food-trade barriers in addition to a poor transport infrastructure.
These barriers include tariﬀs at state borders, numerous licensing requirements for traders
and physical movement restrictions. Despite much publicized economic reforms in the early
1990’s, agriculture continues to be subject to enormous state intervention in the name of food
self-suﬃciency and agricultural markets are not integrated. Accordingly, my empirical work
treats Indian regions like many small partially closed economies, and provides an excellent
opportunity to test the autarky predictions of my model.
In order to investigate the relationship between tastes and local resource endowments
across India, I estimate the tastes deﬁned as above with the further restriction that the price
and income eﬀects are common across India. I regress household demand for agricultural
products on a set of regional dummies and a ﬂexible set of common price and expenditure
terms. The regional component of the unexplained variation in budget shares spent on each
3The model may not be relevant to households on the edge of starvation, who will presumably
maximize caloric intake. However, the average rural Indian household consumes 300 calories less than the
recommended daily intake of 2,400 calories per day (2004/5 NSS data). As 2,400 calories could be purchased
for forty percent of per-capita daily food expenditure yet half the children in rural India are underweight
(2006 NFHS data), many malnourished households seem not to be maximizing nutrition alone.
3food then provides my main taste measure.
It is impossible to observe the impacts of trade liberalization in societies both with and
without habit formation. Therefore, I use rural household survey data from 77 agro-climatic
regions within India to provide empirical evidence for the mechanisms in my model that
reduce the caloric gains from trade on the consumption side. In the ﬁrst stage, I show that
regions have stronger tastes for the foods that their agro-climatic endowments are relatively
well-suited to producing, and that these foods are inexpensive compared to other regions. To
highlight the role of habits, I conﬁrm that the ordering of tastes within a region responds to
relative price changes in the past. Therefore, if India were to liberalize internal trade, each
region’s more favored foods will be expected to rise in relative price as regional prices con-
verge to a uniform national price. In the second stage, I verify that these expected relative
price rises in more favored foods will negatively impact nutrition by showing that between
1987 and 2005, caloric intake declined more in regions where (non trade-induced) price rises
were more concentrated in locally favored foods, controlling for changes in food expenditure.
I conﬁrm my ﬁndings from looking across Indian regions using a second approach. Inter-
state migrants mimic small economies opening to trade, since migrants bring their labor
endowment and preferences but face a new set of prices. Therefore, moving should aﬀect mi-
grants similarly to how my model predicts trade liberalization aﬀects consumers. I show that
inter-state migrants in India do carry their food tastes with them, consuming food bundles
less similar to those consumed in their destination state and more similar to those consumed
in their origin state. Migrant households consume fewer calories for a given level of food
expenditure, because they continue to buy favored products from their origin state that are
now relatively expensive. This eﬀect dissipates with time, disappearing only four generations
after migration. Finally, mirroring the eﬀects of temporal price variation within regions, I
ﬁnd that for the 484 observed migration routes, the caloric intake from a given level of food
expenditure declines more where the relative price rises faced by a migrant are more concen-
trated in that migrant’s preferred origin-state foods. These results even hold when I restrict
4attention to households in which the household head’s wife moved for marriage, and compare
households where the wife moved inter-state to those where the wife moved intra-state.
With these two sets of evidence in place, I quantify the caloric impact of Indian agri-
cultural trade liberalization, and the error associated with ignoring the correlation between
tastes and endowments that comes about through habit formation. If India were to liberalize
its internal agricultural trade (when food prices converge to the Indian median price), trade
will have to generate income gains of at least 3.3 percent for the average Indian household
to maintain their pre-liberalization caloric intake. No such income gains would be neces-
sary if tastes were identical across India. Poorer regions, which consume larger shares of
the local staple foods predicted to rise in price, will require even larger income gains to
maintain caloric intake. Household incomes are likely to increase with liberalization through
increased specialization in food production.4 However, the 3.3 percent increase required to
avoid caloric losses is larger than existing estimates of the static income gains for typical
rural households from other agricultural trade liberalization scenarios.5
In this paper, I focus on the nutritional impacts of trade, measured through caloric intake,6
although my theoretical results apply to welfare in the isomorphic model where preparation
techniques improve with past consumption. In few countries is malnutrition a more impor-
tant issue than in India, which has a higher prevalence of undernutrition than Sub-Saharan
Africa (Deaton and Dreze, 2008). Food consumption itself has regularly been used as a
poverty measure. For example, poverty lines for countries as diverse as the US and India
initially derive from the amount of money required to meet basic caloric needs.
There are several reasons why economists should be directly concerned about poor nu-
trition. Sen (1999) has argued that improving the health of the poor and increasing their
capabilities should be a goal of development in itself. Low caloric intake directly reduces
4For poor Indians, these gains will primarily come through nominal wage gains or falls in the average
food price, since most rural households derive the majority of their income from labor.
5The most direct comparison is China, where reductions in caloric intake over the reform period (Du et
al., 2006) were accompanied by the dismantling of extensive barriers to internal agricultural trade.
6Caloric intake is not the same as nutrition, with vitamin and protein intake also important. However,
as there is no single agreed-upon nutritional metric, in this paper I focus only on calories.
5productivity by reducing energy levels, health capital and the ability of the immune system
to ﬁght oﬀ infectious disease. These eﬀects exert externalities on other members of society.
Malnourished populations allow contagious diseases to spread more readily, and Fogel (1994)
has argued that improved nutrition and its synergies with technological advance can account
for much of the economic growth seen in the West since the Industrial Revolution.
Policymakers often cite explicitly paternalistic concerns. Many of the gains from proper
nutrition come through good health later in life, which uninformed consumers may un-
dervalue. Barker (1992) and others have demonstrated the substantial scarring eﬀects of
nutritional shortfalls at young ages on productivity, earnings and health in adulthood. Ac-
cordingly, even the short-term nutritional declines that can occur during an episode of trade
liberalization are of serious concern, because an entire generation malnourished as children
will continue to suﬀer irremediable consequences for the rest of their lives.
In section 2, I provide a diagrammatic discussion of the theory, with the formal proofs
relegated to appendix C. Section 3 introduces the data and my taste estimates. In section
4, I investigate variations in tastes, prices, endowments and caloric intake across 77 regions
of India. Section 5 uses data on inter-state migrants within India to conﬁrm the regional re-
sults. Section 6 discusses India’s internal trade restrictions and predicts the caloric impact of
relaxing these restrictions. Finally, section 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Modelling Habit Formation in Food Consumption
I start by describing consumer preferences in an overlapping generations model that fea-
tures habit formation in food tastes. I then justify my assumptions about the form of the
utility function by reviewing the literature on the development of food preferences. Finally,
I analyze this simple economy in autarky.
Identical individuals in a small region live for two periods, childhood and adulthood. In the
second period, individuals obtain factors of production, spend their full income from these
factors and have a single child. Adults in generation t choose their relative consumption of
6the two goods in the economy, rice, r, and wheat, w, both measured in calories. The child and
the parent share the parent’s preferred consumption bundle, and form a single household.7
I model household demand as follows. The budget share spent on rice is a function hr(.)
of relative prices, pr/pw, total (food) expenditure, food, and a rice taste shifter, tastesr:8




In the next period the child grows up and the bundle that he or she consumed as a child in-
ﬂuences his or her adult preferences. I will call this habit formation, with an adult developing










Therefore, the adult’s utility function depends on both past and present consumption, as is
common in the habit formation literature starting with Stone (1956) and including Becker
and Murphy (1988). Additionally, I assume that parents are myopic, and so do not antici-
pate the eﬀect of their consumption choices on the future tastes of their child. Accordingly,
household demand in period t does not depend on expected future prices or incomes.10
Strong and enduring taste patterns characterize food consumption. Ample evidence in the
psychology and nutrition literatures indicates that certain food preferences form in childhood.
Children have a predisposition to fear new foods, which is only overcome through repeated
opportunities to consume a food (Birch, 1999). The literature hypothesizes that this re-
sponse serves a protective function, so that foragers can learn what foods are safe to eat.
This is common across omnivores, and has been shown in controlled experiments among
7Speciﬁcally, parents gain equal utility from their own and their child’s consumption. Parents are not
altruistic, or are uninformed about the importance of childhood nutrition, as they choose their child’s diet
based solely on their own preferences.
8The budget share spent on rice increases with the tastes for rice and decreases with the relative
rice price. The Cobb-Douglas utility function generates household demands of this type, with hr(.)
equal to zero. The main results from my paper carry through with a more general demand speciﬁcation,
bsharert = e hr(
prt
pwt,foodt,tastesrt), as long as ∂bsharert/∂tastesrt > 0.
9Habit formation may occur more quickly than this, which can be accommodated by including several
stages of adult life, with past consumption inﬂuencing current preferences. For example, preferences for
eating raw ﬁsh in sushi have developed rapidly in the West over a single generation.
10Even if this assumption is violated, parents will only partially adjust their child’s diet if there is
uncertainty over the prevailing relative prices when their child reaches adulthood, or if there are costs to
preparing two separate meals for both themselves and their child.
7both humans and rats. More directly, a mother’s diet during pregnancy and lactation aﬀects
her child’s preferences for ﬂavors and foods in later life (Mennella et al., 2001).
Social factors also play an important role in forming preferences. There is abundant ev-
idence, again from controlled experiments involving humans and other mammals, that the
young are more likely to accept new or disliked foods if they observe their mothers or other
role models consuming them (Birch, 1999). This eﬀect works through two channels; role
models both induce children to try a food for the ﬁrst time which overcomes the initial
neophobia, and provide a pleasant context in which the food is eaten. As an example of
the latter channel, second generation US immigrants from India may enjoy eating curry
more than their non-Indian peers in part because of the positive association that has formed
between consuming Indian food and dining at home with family members.
Crucially for my assumptions about habit formation, preferences gained in childhood per-
sist in the available longitudinal data. Data from the Minnesota Heart Health Program
(Kelder, 1994) show that food preference rankings remain unchanged over 6 years.11 There-
fore, this extensive set of evidence supports my assumption that food preferences are posi-
tively related to the consumption patterns of the previous generation.
In order to model the production side of the economy, I use a speciﬁc factors model that
matches the realities of food production well. A region has a ﬁxed endowment of laborers, L,
and two additional factors: land suitable for rice cultivation, Tr, and land suitable for wheat
cultivation, Tw. Both rice and wheat are produced with constant returns to scale technology
using labor and the single speciﬁc land factor, with diminishing returns to an increase in any
one factor.12 To grow wheat, a farmer requires well-drained soil, low humidity and moderate
temperatures. Rice grows most easily in coastal plains, lowland deltas and tidal plains where
paddies are submerged in water. These agro-climatic conditions are ﬁxed over time and can
explain why the arid plains of Rajasthan produce mainly wheat and West Bengal in the
11All of the sample faced the same relative prices, yet there were substantial and persistent variations in
food rankings which can not be explained by the common price eﬀects.
12All of the main results carry through to the Heckscher-Ohlin model where there are only two factors,
Tr and Tw, which are required to produce both goods, but rice is relatively more intensive in factor Tr.





















Ganges Delta produces mainly rice.
There is no migration13 and factor endowments are ﬁxed over generations. High transport
costs and trade restrictions imply an initial equilibrium with autarky. In addition, there is
no storage technology, so that all food is consumed in the period that it is produced.
Figure 1 describes the autarkic equilibrium. I ﬁrst plot the production possibilities frontier
(PPF), the locus of the maximum feasible combinations of wheat and rice that can be pro-
duced using a region’s endowment and a technology that is identical across all regions. The
ﬁgure shows a bowed out PPF14 for the home region which has a relatively larger endowment
of rice land than wheat land. I represent preferences by an aggregate indiﬀerence curve for
the whole economy. I assume that in the ﬁrst generation, adult consumers have "neutral"
tastes only for calories and dietary variety, corresponding to tastesr1 = 1/2 and a indiﬀerence
curve that is perpendicular to the 45 degree line at any half-rice half-wheat bundle.15
13This is a reasonable assumption in India, where there is very little migration (Munshi and Rosenzweig,
2009). In section 5, I study the small population of inter-state migrants.
14The PPF bows out due to diminishing returns to each factor in the rice and wheat production functions.
15In the representation shown, consumers have a taste for variety and not simply for calories.
9Consumption occurs at point A1, with relatively more rice than wheat consumed. Since
rice land is abundant in the economy, labor ﬂows into rice production to equalize the wage
across sectors, increasing the relative production of rice. This higher relative production
induces a drop in the rice price to equilibrate supply and demand and so pr1/pw1 < 1.16 The
full equilibrium is described in appendix C.1.
Tastes develop through habit formation, and so when the children of the ﬁrst generation
reach adulthood they have stronger tastes for rice than their parents as they consumed rela-
tively more rice than wheat in their youth (tastesr2 > tastesr1). I label the preferences of the
second generation "rice-loving tastes" in ﬁgure 1. This generation has an increased relative
demand for rice. As the endowment is ﬁxed, the rice price must rise in order to induce an in-
crease in the supply of rice and bring the market back into equilibrium (pr2/pw2 > pr1/pw1).
The second generation adults consume at A2, with relative rice consumption even higher
than in the previous generation (r2/w2 > r1/w1).
Tastes for rice will continue to increase with each generation until generation s, when the
price rise induced by the increased demand for rice is suﬃciently large to leave relative rice
consumption unchanged, d(rs/ws)/d(rs−1/ws−1) = 0. An interior steady state may not exist
if habit formation is so strong that the price response is never large enough to negate fully the
consumption increase. In appendix C.5, I explore the conditions for the existence of an inte-
rior steady state in the case of Cobb-Douglas consumption and production functions. Such
a steady state exists and is stable, with rice remaining cheaper than wheat (prs/pws < 1), as
long as there is a suﬃcient love of variety (complementarity in consumption) so that tastes
do not respond excessively to consumption changes.
It is an empirical question whether habit formation is suﬃciently strong to make the good
produced using the abundant factor relatively more expensive under autarky (prs/pws > 1).
I will provide supportive empirical evidence for India that the price of a particular food is
indeed cheaper in regions where resource endowments are relatively well-suited to growing
that food crop. The same is true for the many countries listed in the introduction which
16The relative price is equal to −dw/dr at the point where the indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the PPF.
10imposed export bans. Accordingly, in the exposition that follows I will assume that an inte-
rior autarky steady state exists and rice remains relatively cheaper than wheat if rice land
is more abundant in the region, Tr > Tw, and term this Assumption 1.17
Hypothesis 1: A region develops tastes inversely related to the relative prices it faces.
Therefore, tastes will become positively correlated with a region’s relative resource endow-
ments. Proof under the assumption of homothetic preferences in appendix C.1.
Habit formation leads to something similar to the much used Armington (1968) home-
biased preferences,18 where preferences favor locally-produced varieties of a given good by
assumption. Here, biased preferences for local goods are not ad hoc but emerge endogenously
from endowments and are far more plausible for non-diﬀerentiated goods, where the region
of origin cannot be inferred from the good itself.
Nutrition improves in the second generation. My nutrition metric is caloric intake, which
is simply r + w. Accordingly, the isocalorie line is perpendicular to the 45 degree line. The
second generation more readily consumes the abundant calorie source, rice. Therefore, as
long as rice remains cheaper than wheat, the second generation ends up better nourished.19 In
each subsequent generation, caloric intake will further increase until a steady state is reached.
Hypothesis 2: The next generation will consume a larger total quantity of calories if tastes
develop to favor the relatively cheap calorie source, as long as that calorie source remains
relatively cheap. Proof in appendix C.3.
The fact that caloric consumption increases with habit formation provides an evolutionary
justiﬁcation for a utility function that depends on past relative consumption. Habit forma-
tion would evolve endogenously from a simple game-theoretic evolutionary model. Societies
17Precise conditions appear in appendix C.2. If rice does not remain relatively cheap, then habit
formation has changed which goods each region has a comparative advantage in, and more favored goods
will fall in price upon liberalization.
18Armington home-biased preferences are used in the empirical trade literature to explain home-bias
eﬀects found in trade data as well as in most modern Computable General Equilibrium trade models.
19In the model, calories are not a production input. Changing tastes may lower net nutrition by inducing
a movement of labor into more physically demanding sectors. Although jobs in India have become less
physically demanding (Deaton and Dreze, 2008), it is unlikely that the resource comparative advantage
sectors are systematically more physically intensive, as would be required to reverse my results.
11exhibiting such traits will be better nourished and hence ﬁtter in an evolutionary sense,
making them able to outcompete other groups.
2.2 Opening the Economy to Trade
Comparing changes in welfare upon trade liberalization between two societies, one with
and one without habit formation, is not possible if the preferences of the two societies diﬀer.
Accordingly, I restrict my focus to analyzing caloric intake rather than welfare. Section 2.5
details an isomorphic model where equivalent welfare statements can be made as consumers
have ﬁxed preferences for food quality, and the quality level of a particular food depends on
recipes and preparation techniques that develop alongside past consumption.
What happens when this small region liberalizes trade after many generations under au-
tarky? Trade liberalization generally takes place in waves over several years, but tastes
change only across generations. Therefore, I evaluate the short-run impact of a trade lib-
eralization at time T, as shown in the timeline below, with tastes held ﬁxed at their pre-
liberalization values. I compare the case where tastes in the region favor the relatively
abundant good, rice, against the case in which tastes are still neutral and independent of
endowments. As I have shown in the previous section, this positive correlation between
preferences and endowments arises naturally from a model of habit formation, although the












Figure 2 shows the new equilibrium for the region after opening to trade with a world
where wheat is relatively cheap (the world price line has a gradient less than -1). Post trade
values are denoted by asterisks. With trade, the region can separate its consumption and
production decisions and produces at point Q*, and accordingly there are standard gains
from trade through specialization in rice production.



















Without habit formation, when tastes for rice and wheat are neutral, the region consumes
at point B under autarky and B* after liberalization. Caloric intake increases by the vector
length of the arrow from point B to the isocalorie line passing through B*. With habit
formation, tastes in the region favor rice and consumption moves from A to A*. The aggre-
gate caloric gains from trade are much smaller (the vector length of the arrow originating at
A). Aggregate caloric consumption with rice-loving tastes is smaller post trade liberalization
compared with neutral tastes, but was larger pre trade (hypothesis 2), implying that the
short-run caloric gains from trade shrink with habit formation.
Hypothesis 3: Habit formation reduces the short-run aggregate caloric elasticities with
respect to trade liberalization. Proof under assumption 1 for p∗
r/p∗
w ≥ 1 in appendix C.4.
In the generations following trade liberalization, the taste for rice will decline as relative
wheat consumption rises. This process produces further caloric gains for future generations,
as they spend an increasingly large share of their budget on wheat, the relatively cheaper
calorie source post trade. After many generations wheat loving preferences develop and
13the aggregate caloric intake will actually exceed that with neutral tastes.20 However, the
eﬀects on the current generation are of primary importance to elected policymakers, and
accordingly I focus on these initial impacts in the paper.
The reduction in the aggregate caloric gains from trade derives from both the consumption
and production sides of the economy. On the production side, the correlation between
preferences and endowments brought about by habit formation brings autarky prices closer
together by bidding up the price of the region’s relatively abundant food, thereby reducing
the gains from specialization at the moment of trade liberalization. However, it is the
consumption side that will be the focus of my empirical work, and in the next section I will
highlight the consumption eﬀects by looking at individual consumption, holding income ﬁxed.
2.3 Consumption Side Impacts of Trade
I can illustrate more clearly the consumption side eﬀects of trade liberalization in a society
with habit formation by analyzing the eﬀect of price changes on individuals, as opposed to
the aggregate eﬀects described previously in a general equilibrium setting. My empirical
data contain consumers with a range of factor endowments, whose income gains from trade
will vary. Therefore, to motivate my empirical strategy, I analyze how tastes alter caloric
gains from trade on the consumption side in partial equilibrium by holding incomes constant.
Figure 3 shows the consumption impact of an exogenous rise in the relative price of rice
for an individual factor owner, holding income constant. For simplicity, I assume that one
calorie of either wheat or rice can be purchased for the same price prior to the price change.
At this price the consumer will have the same caloric intake regardless of his or her rela-
tive tastes for rice and wheat.21 I display the individual utility functions for two sets of
preferences, rice-loving and neutral tastes.
To explore the eﬀect of a rise in the price of rice and an equally sized fall in the price of
wheat, I rotate the budget set counterclockwise around bundle B, thereby keeping income
ﬁxed. These are the type of price changes that would be seen in regions abundant in rice
20This economy is small. For two large symmetric economies opening to trade, the post trade price will
be 1, and long run caloric intake will be identical with and without habit formation.
21I assume local non-satiation. The budget set edge now coincides with the isocalorie line.


















land as regional prices move towards the integrated equilibrium prices. The solid lines show
the pre-price-change and the dashed lines the post-price-change situation. In the case of
rice-loving tastes, caloric intake declines, with the new consumption bundle A* on a lower
isocalorie line, while caloric intake increases for the case of neutral tastes in the move to B*.
Caloric intake declines for rice-loving consumers through the combination of wealth and
substitution channels. Rice-loving consumers initially spend a large portion of their budget
on rice, and so a larger increase in expenditure would be required to aﬀord their original
consumption bundle after the relative price change. Because of their strong tastes for rice,
these consumers are reluctant to substitute into the cheapening calorie source, wheat, which
would allow them to avoid a decline in caloric intake. Therefore, consumers who have devel-
oped tastes that favor rice require larger increases in nominal food expenditure to maintain
their caloric intake when rice becomes relatively more expensive.
The simple exposition in ﬁgure 3 holds nominal food expenditure constant. Trade changes
real factor incomes and so the budget set may also shift. My empirical work estimates how
large the increase in food expenditure will have to be in order for the average rural Indian
15household to maintain its caloric intake upon internal trade liberalization. I then compare
this number to the required food expenditure increase if tastes were identical across India.
In the example above, the two goods had an equal price per calorie prior to the price
change. Even if rice was a cheaper calorie source prior to liberalization and remained so, the
net eﬀect of tastes on caloric intake will generally still be negative as rice-loving tastes in-
crease the budget share spent on rice before the price change, reducing caloric intake through
the wealth channel.22 The price per calorie will also vary for reasons unrelated to endow-
ments. For example, to produce one edible calorie, meat requires greater energy inputs than
rice. A rise in the price of rice will induce a standard substitution eﬀect, with relative meat
consumption rising, lowering caloric intake. These eﬀects will be asymmetric, with meat
producing regions gaining calories through this channel and rice producing regions losing.
However, my habit formation mechanism will be occurring for all regions within broad food
groups. Consumers are reluctant to substitute from local to foreign cereals, and at the same
time from local to foreign meats. Therefore, I control for the initial price per calorie explicitly
in the empirical work as this substitution between food groups of diﬀerent caloric intensity
is not my focus of attention.
The eﬀect of price changes on caloric intake shown in ﬁgure 3 can be derived for G goods
subject to small equilibrium price deviations. The total calories consumed by an individual





I log-linearize calories around the equilibrium price and apply the envelope theorem:23











The log change in caloric intake, ∆lncalories, equals the log change in food expenditure,
minus the summation of the interaction between log price changes and both the budget
22If rice is a Giﬀen good for some consumers, rice consumption will rise after the price change, and
consumption of the other good will fall considerably. However, this will generally still result in caloric intake
decreasing unless rice remains a substantially cheaper calorie source after the price change. Jensen and
Miller (2008) provide evidence of Giﬀen behavior in extremely poor households in Hunan, China.
23In appendix D.2, I show the full linearization that relaxes the envelope theorem assumption that
budget shares remain constant. P is the vector of G prices. Food expenditure, food, is assumed additively
separable from other expenditure. If this is not the case hg(P,income) should replace hg(P,food).
16shares and the inverse of the relative price per calorie of each good g. Tastes aﬀect caloric
intake since ∆lncalories decreases with the correlation between tastes and price changes.
Hypothesis 4: For a given set of price changes, the greater the correlation between tastes
and the price changes, the more caloric intake will decrease, conditional upon total food
expenditure and the relative price per calorie.
2.4 Distributional Issues and Absolute Caloric Losses from Trade
Up to this point, I have shown that the aggregate caloric gains from trade shrink in a
model with habit formation but I have not discussed the distribution of these reduced gains.
Liberalizing agricultural trade will lead to production gains through specialization, and the
total world output of calories will increase. Accordingly, the small region will still generally
see aggregate caloric gains from trade. As with the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the real rental
income accruing to the owners of rice land will rise, and the real rental income accruing to the
owners of wheat land will fall. Habit formation reduces the aggregate production gains from
trade by bringing autarky prices closer together, and so these income changes for landowners
will be muted. At the same time all factor owners, including the mobile factor, labor, will
be negatively aﬀected on consumption side as their more favored foods rise in price.
Most of the poor in the developing world have few productive assets other than their own
labor, and so the likely impact on wages is particularly relevant for exploring the impact of
agricultural trade on the poor.24 Ruﬃn and Jones (1977) analyze the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on landless labor’s real income in a speciﬁc factors model. The nominal income gain
from trade for the mobile factor is a weighted average of the price changes. The authors
term this fact the neoclassical ambiguity, since with a suﬃciently large share of consumption
in the high ∆lnpg goods, the real wage of labor will actually fall.25 A similar result holds
for caloric intake, as can be seen from equation 2. Landless labor can suﬀer absolute caloric
24In India 31 percent of rural households derive their livelihood primarily from agricultural labor and 33
percent from self-employment in agriculture (NSS 1987/88). However, much of the income for self-employed
agricultural households with small landholdings comes from their labor rather than their implicit rent.
25Ruﬃn and Jones (1977) assume that the tastes of laborers are not biased towards the comparative
advantage good relative to the population as a whole and are independent of comparative advantage. They
conclude that there is a presumption that labor will beneﬁt from trade.
17losses from trade, with or without habit formation. However, habit formation produces a
positive correlation between tastes and trade-induced price changes, and so larger increases
in nominal food expenditure are required to avoid a decline in caloric intake.26
Absolute caloric losses for landless laborers are especially likely if this group has par-
ticularly strong tastes for the comparative advantage foods, yet does not see large rises in
nominal income compared to other groups. This may be expected, since landless laborers are
typically near the bottom of the income distribution, and the poor consume less diversiﬁed
diets and disproportionately large quantities of the cheap local staples that rise in price with
trade. Such diﬀerences in tastes arise naturally across income groups in the model above
when preferences are non-homothetic, with richer households developing more diversiﬁed
tastes as they chose to indulge in more expensive and varied diets in previous generations.27
In appendix C.7, I present a simple parametrization of the model using the same non-
homothetic preferences that I use in my empirics. I demonstrate that, under reasonable
parameter values, landless labor develops particularly strong tastes for the locally abundant
foods. Accordingly, this group loses in caloric terms at the time of trade liberalization, while
they would have gained from trade in a world without habit formation. In section 6, I present
supporting evidence for India that poor landless households do indeed require relatively larger
nominal income rises at the time of trade liberalization in order to avoid caloric losses.
2.5 Welfare Implications Using Quality Improvements
This paper focuses on the nutritional consequences of trade liberalization, but I can also
interpret the model in utility terms with a small alteration. The model is isomorphic to one
where individuals have ﬁxed preferences and there are local transformation technologies for
converting raw food products into palatable meals. The technologies encompass both recipes
and preparation techniques. Improvements in the transformation technologies are functions
26Habit formation may also alter the distribution of the production gains from trade. Appendix C.5.1
shows that for the mobile factor, labor, any redistributed gains accruing to labor do not compensate for the
consumption loss, and habit formation reduces labor’s caloric gains from trade in the Cobb-Douglas case.
27These diﬀerent preferences may explain the fact that richer households are more in favor of trade
liberalization than poorer ones. Richer households are better able to take advantage of price changes at the
time of liberalization, as they have already developed tastes for the goods which trade makes relatively cheap.
18of relative consumption.28 Returning to the Indian example, a family in Rajasthan may be
expert at transforming wheat into delicious roti (a ﬂat bread), but may lack the ability to
make a decent jhal-muri (a rice ball popular in West Bengal), because wheat-growing regions
learn methods of transforming wheat into high quality meals faster than they learn how to
improve the quality of rice dishes they rarely prepare. This reinterpretation allows for an
evaluation of the welfare impacts of the model.
The utility gains from trade are muted since consumers continue to buy the local foods
that they prepare well rather than the now cheaper imported foods that they are less familiar
with. In appendix C.6, I formally show the isomorphism of the transformation technology
and preference change models and prove that, for landless labor in the Cobb-Douglas case,
the welfare elasticity with respect to trade liberalization declines if food transformation
techniques develop proportionally to previous consumption.29
Hypothesis 3*: Food transformation technologies that improve with relative consumption
reduce the short-run aggregate welfare elasticities with respect to trade liberalization.
The historical example of the Columbian Exchange suggests that both tastes and transfor-
mation technologies for local foods reduce the initial gains from trade. Europe had imported
both potatoes and tomatoes prior to 1544. However, tomatoes were initially used as table
ornaments, with the ﬁrst recipe for tomato sauce appearing only in 1839. Traditional sta-
ples continued to be preferred to potatoes even in times of famine well into the 1800’s, at
which time potato consumption increased with state intervention (Nunn and Qian, 2009) and
tastier preparation methods (a fried potato slice recipe ﬁrst appeared in 1795). It took both
core preference changes and preparation improvements for European consumers to experi-
ence large caloric and utility gains from these new crops. In section 5.2, I provide evidence
that local transformation technologies alone cannot account for the results I ﬁnd in India.
28This has obvious similarities to the induced agricultural innovation of Hayami and Ruttan (1971).
A similar bias evolves from a pure information story in which consumers know about the existence and
nutritional content of local foods, and are less familiar with foods that trade makes relatively cheap.
29Similarly to the habit model, landless labor can lose in utility terms at the time of trade liberalization,
but would avoid such a loss if technological improvements were independent of past relative consumption.
193 Empirically Testing the Theory
It is impossible to observe the impacts of trade liberalization in societies both with and
without habit formation. Therefore hypothesis 3, which compares the short-run caloric gains
in a society with habit formation to one without, cannot be tested directly. However, the
mechanisms in my model that reduce the caloric gains from trade on the consumption side
can be tested. If a region has stronger tastes for the foods that its agro-climatic endowments
are relatively well-suited to producing, and these foods are inexpensive compared to other
regions (hypothesis 1 and assumption 1), price rises will systematically occur in more fa-
vored foods. Hypothesis 4, in which individual caloric intake declines when tastes correlate
with price changes, then implies that trade needs to generate larger increases in total food
expenditure for an individual to avoid a caloric loss at the time of liberalization. If these
two hypotheses are supported, and if I can show that preferences do respond to past con-
sumption, this is strong evidence that habit formation reduces the caloric gains from trade
liberalization on the consumption side.30
I carry out the tests detailed above by looking at tastes and prices across 77 regions of
India, and analyzing the impact of temporal price changes. I then provide complementary
evidence from the consumption patterns of inter-state migrants, and from the caloric impacts
of the spatial price changes that these migrants’ face when they move. Migrants provide a
natural experiment that mimics a small economy opening to trade as they take the prices
of their destination-state upon migration, yet maintain the preferences of the state in which
they were born.31 Finally, I quantify the caloric impact of the regional taste diﬀerences
that I document if India were to liberalize its internal agricultural markets by performing
the consumption side of the counterfactual exercise suggested by ﬁgure 3. I predict the size
of the total food expenditure gains required to avoid a short-run caloric loss if prices were
to equalize across regions and compare this ﬁgure to the predicted size of the total food
30Habit formation should also reduce the aggregate production gains from trade, but this I will not be
able to test without observing autarky prices in a society without habit formation.
31The use of migrants to evaluate the impact of price changes dates back at least to Staehle (1934).
20expenditure gains required if tastes were identical across India.
3.1 Data
Both empirical approaches utilize household data from the Indian National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO). My main sample comes from the 43rd round (1987-88), which is the
only comprehensive (thick) round available containing extensive migration data linked to a
full consumption module. In order to explore the impact of temporal price changes, I also use
household data from various other quinquennial thick rounds. Each round contains obser-
vations for 80,000 rural households and 45,000 urban households. The NSSO surveys record
quantities purchased and expenditures for every food item consumed from a list of several
hundred. From this data I calculate unit values which serve as my price data.32 The surveys
also provide many household characteristics, other expenditures and migration details.
I obtain calorie data for each household by multiplying each food’s caloric content, esti-
mated by the NSSO, by the quantity consumed over the previous 30 days. I use this number
to calculate the daily caloric intake per household member. I aggregate up to 52 of the
most common food products,33 and deﬁne food expenditure as total expenditure on these 52
foods.34 Endowment data come from a variety of sources and are described in appendix B.
3.2 Estimating Tastes
Obtaining a measure of local tastes presents my most diﬃcult empirical task. Since prefer-
ences change only over generations in my model, tastes will be ﬁxed in the short run and can
be identiﬁed using cross-sectional data. I use the data from the 1987-88 survey and regress
individual budget shares on income, prices and household characteristics, and attribute the
32For home production, consumption is valued at the prevailing local farm-gate price. The unit values
correspond well to farm harvest prices and provide large amounts of price information at a ﬁne geographic
level. However, unit values are not actual prices since quality varies, an issue I discuss in section 4.1.
33They are: Rice, Wheat, Jowar, Bajra, Maize, Barley, Small Millets, Ragi, Gram, Cereal Substitutes,
Arhar, Moong, Masur, Urd, Peas, Soyabean, Khesari, Other Pulses, Milk Products, Vanaspati/Margarine,
Mustard Oil, Groundnut Oil, Coconut Oil, Other Oil, Meat, Chicken/Eggs, Fish, Potato, Onion, Sweet
Potato, Cauliﬂower, Cabbage, Brinjal, Lady Finger, Tomato, Chillis, Other Vegetables, Coconuts, Other
Nuts, Banana, Mango, Oranges, Lemon, Guava, Other Fruits, Sugar, Garlic, Ginger, Turmeric, Black
Pepper, Other Spices and Pan/Supari.
34This aggregation omits processed foods and beverages that constitute less than 2 percent of caloric
intake. For these goods, it is impossible to match the good to an agro-climatic endowment, or to obtain
accurate quantity or caloric data. However, results are robust to including these goods and using recorded
quantities and NSSO calorie approximations.
21remaining regional variation to local tastes.
With a suﬃciently ﬂexible functional form, the tastes implicitly deﬁned by bshareg =
tastesg + hg(P,income) will be identiﬁed separately from the common price and income ef-
fects as long as there is price variation within regions which is not driven by taste diﬀerences.
For example, if markets are not fully integrated within a region,35 recent local supply shocks
such as local rainfall variation or infrastructure improvements would cause prices to vary
between villages, and allow the identiﬁcation of regional tastes.
I estimate these residual tastes using the functional form for hg(P,income) suggested by
the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS) of Deaton and Muell-
bauer (1980a). In the basic AIDS speciﬁcation, the budget share spent on food g in region
r is a function of a good-speciﬁc constant, log prices for every good and log real income. I
allow this constant term to vary by region by including a full set of regional dummies, dgr,
and the coeﬃcients on these dummies, tastesgr, are my regional taste measure:36
bsharegr = tastesgrdgr +
X
g0




where pgr is the price per calorie of good g in region r, income is total expenditure and Pr
is the regional price index.37 This speciﬁcation derives from a "ﬂexible functional form" cost
(or expenditure) function, c(u,p), that can be regarded as a second order approximation to
any arbitrary cost function. I allow the ﬁrst-order price terms, tastesgr, to vary by region:


















Equation 3 is then obtained via Shephard’s Lemma, where γgg0 = γg0g = 1/2(γ∗
gg0+γ∗
g0g). Fol-




g bsharegr lnpgr, making the system linear.38 The Marshallian own and cross-
price elasticities in this demand speciﬁcation depend on the taste parameter tastesgr, with
35Jha et al. (2005) show that there are rice markets within the same region that are not integrated.
36Blanciforti and Green (n.d.) ﬁrst interpreted the AIDS constant as an evolving taste shifter.
37The price index Pr is deﬁned by logPr = α0 +
P




g0 γgg0 lnpgr lnpg0r.
38bsharegr is the average budget share of good g in region r.
22increased tastes for a food reducing the cross-price elasticity of demand for substitutes.39
I assume weak separability between the consumption of my 52 food groups and other
expenditures. This assumption allows me to estimate demand conditional upon total food
expenditure by replacing budget shares with food expenditure shares and income with total
expenditure on the 52 foods, foodi (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b).40 I estimate equation 4
separately for each good using OLS over all i households, where the within-region variation
in prices, foodi and Zi allows the identiﬁcation of βg, Π, the γgg0’s and the residual tastesgr:41
bsharegri = tastesgrdgr +
X
g0




+ ΠZi + εgri. (4)
I include additional demographic and seasonal controls Zi and use survey weights.42 I as-
sume that there is a common price in each village, a reasonable assumption given that there
is typically only one food market in an Indian village, and accordingly use median village
prices, pg0v, as the prices faced by households in village v.43
Under the null hypothesis of no regional taste diﬀerences, all these estimated tastesgr
should be identical. The null is rejected for all foods except sweet potato, with signiﬁcant
tastesgr diﬀerences across regions (the mean F-stat for the 52 Wald tests is 31.8). The co-














δgg0=0 if g6=g0. The partial derivatives with
respect to tastes are as follows: ∂gg0r/∂tastesgr = −gg0r/bsharegr < 0 if g 6= g0 and gg0r > 0 ).
∂ggr/∂tastesgr = −(ggr + 1 − βg)/bsharegr if g = g0.
40The alternative solution involves making arbitrary assumptions about non-food elasticities since it is
extremely diﬃcult to obtain reliable unit values for non-food items which are often highly diﬀerentiated
products, or services where it hard to record the quantity purchased.
41The AIDS should satisfy adding up, homogeneity and symmetry when every individual consumes every
item. Since none of the 128,000 sample households purchase all 52 foods, Deaton (1997) interprets OLS equa-
tion 4 as a linear approximation to the conditional budget share averaging over zero and non-zero purchases.
42Demographic controls include household size, composition, religion, caste and primary activity.
43The use of individual prices imparts a bias (measurement errors in individual prices alter budget shares)
and there are endogeneity concerns (if individual price paid is correlated with omitted variables). The median
village prices are robust to outliers and not contaminated by quality eﬀects that would typically overstate the
price response. In order to avoid losing all village observations when a single price is missing, if none of the
village sample report purchasing a good, I use the median price at an incrementally higher level of aggregation
until a purchase is reported. The γgg0’s will be biased if unrecorded products were available locally, but were
unusually expensive and so not purchased by the sample. Therefore, in appendix D, I show results carry
through when I add two types of ad valorem transport cost to these imputed prices: A 5 percent cost for each
incremental level of aggregation, and a cost calculated from sugar price diﬀerences between the two areas.
23poorly measured that the price coeﬃcients are attenuated to zero.44
Reassuringly, the empirical results presented in sections 5.1 through 5.3, which are based
on the consumption patterns of migrants, do not rely on the validity of these taste estimates.
Appendix D addresses the robustness of these taste estimates directly. Although households
take village prices as given, there are still endogeneity concerns if there is price variation
across villages that originates from idiosyncratic village tastes that raise both local prices
and demand.45 Therefore, I instrument for local village prices with the prices in a nearby
village, where supply conditions will be similar. However, this nearby village’s taste shock
will be uncorrelated with the individual’s error term. The instrumentation procedure also
provides consistent parameter estimates if village prices are poorly measured, but errors
are uncorrelated across villages. I also show that the rank ordering of tastes for a given
food across the 77 regions is unbiased if the foods are substitutes for each other and price
deviations within regions are only weakly correlated across foods.
Appendix D contains several additional robustness checks: In case total food expenditure
is endogenous to demand for a particular food, I instrument food expenditure with non-food
expenditure, which allows me to bound this bias.46 I allow for region speciﬁc γgg0 terms by
drawing on additional data and price variation from the two adjacent NSSO thick rounds.
Finally, I allow the own-price elasticities to depend on household characteristics by interact-
ing the full set of control variables, Zi, with the own price term, lnpgv. In all cases, the main
results are robust to using these alternative tastes estimates.
4447 of the foods have p-values less than 0.00005 from the F-tests on the price terms. If prices were
poorly measured and there were no regional taste diﬀerences, tastesgr would absorb the true price eﬀects.
Therefore, I use other prices (mean, minimum, maximum, 25th and 75th percentile village price) instead of
medians. Results are unchanged and shown in appendix D for the endowment and price relationships, and
available on request for other regressions. Additionally, if the taste estimates simply reﬂect unmeasured
regional price variation, they would not respond negatively to historic price changes, as I ﬁnd in section 4.2.
45For example, the arrival of an immigrant who introduces a new food or recipe to the village. If, instead,
village taste diﬀerences originate from agro-climatic endowments varying within regions, the analysis should
ideally be carried out at a lower geographical level. When these village agro-climatic endowment deviations
are uncorrelated across space, my instrumentation strategy provides unbiased estimates of average regional
tastes as long as spatially-correlated recent local supply shocks provide additional price variation.
46This strategy also deals with correlated measurement error concerns (as foodi appears in the denom-
inator of the food share) if the measurement errors in food and non-food expenditure are independent.
244 Empirical Approach 1: Comparing Regions Across India
India contains 77 NSSO regions drawn along agro-climatic boundaries and within the
borders of the 31 states.47 The theory suggests that tastes are related to agro-climatic
endowments, making this an appropriate unit. Inter-state tariﬀs, trade regulations and
transportation costs, detailed in appendix A, mean that markets in these regions are not
fully integrated, and so I think of these regions as small economies in autarky.
Figure 4: Price and Food Expenditure Share Variation Across Regions of India, 1987-88
















































Figure 4 illustrates the variation in food expenditure shares and prices in 1987-88. In
arid Western Rajasthan, wheat, bajra (pearl millet) and milk are the most important food
sources. Households in Inland Eastern Maharashtra spend the largest portion of their food
47Only 76 regions have rural samples in 1987-88, since only urban strata were sampled in Nagaland. Four
new states were formed in the 1990’s, but regions did not change, bar Goa separating from Daman and Diu.
25budgets on jowar (sorghum), while those in the Western Plains of West Bengal, by the
Ganges Delta, devote a full 57 percent of their food budget to rice. In Southern Kerala, ﬁsh
supplements rice as the major food source. In all these cases, prices are relatively cheaper in
the regions where the corresponding foods are consumed most. However, this price variation
is insuﬃcient to fully explain the enormous variation in food expenditure shares, and these
unexplained components form my taste estimates.
I restrict attention to rural households, which comprise around three-quarters of India’s
population. Rural households spend a larger portion of their income on food, compared to
urban households, and their tastes are likely to be more closely related to local endowments
because of traditional lifestyles, greater trade barriers with other parts of India, minimal
consumption of processed food and less food consumption that occurs outside the house.
4.1 Tastes relate positively to relative endowments, negatively to prices
Habit formation in food consumption predicts that regional endowments above the Indian
average should lead to the development of above average tastes for the food intensive in that
endowment (hypothesis 1), as the food was relatively inexpensive in previous generations.
Therefore, in the absence of the full history of past price data, I regress my taste estimates
on a measure of the relative agro-climatic endowment for each good in each region, which
would have determined the historic autarky prices.
The speciﬁc factors model suggests using the area planted of a crop, areagr, as the initial
endowment. In reality, land can be planted with a variety of crops, and the current cropping
patterns may be aﬀected by factors unrelated to the initial resource endowments that shaped
tastes over many generations.48 Therefore, the observed proportion of a region planted with
a crop is a noisy measure of the historic agro-climatic endowment, and so I use a two-stage
procedure that estimates the relative suitability of diﬀerent regions for growing each crop.
In the ﬁrst stage, I regress observed relative endowments on agro-climatic variables. My
observed relative endowment measure is the proportion of a region’s farmland planted with
a speciﬁc crop, averaged over the 1970’s, the earliest period available in my dataset and prior
48For example, recent technological advances, government subsidies or agricultural policies.
26to the period in which I estimate tastes.49 I ﬁnd very similar results, shown in table D.1,
when I use the proportion of a region’s total production in either weight or value terms. I
regress these observed relative endowments on agro-climatic variables, AgClimr, allowing








a1g0AgClimrdg0 + ugr. (5)
Following Dev and Evenson (2003), I choose a selection of AgClimr variables that impact
crop growth in the Indian sub-continent (the altitude, the mean temperature in January,
April, July and October and mean rainfall for June, July and August).50 I then use the pre-
dicted values from this regression as my estimate of the historic relative resource endowment




In the second stage, I regress my taste estimates on predicted agro-climatic endowments:
tastesgr = b0 + b1endowmentgr + εgr. (6)
Both stages are run simultaneously using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood.51 As
the magnitudes of tastes and observed endowments vary greatly over the 52 foods, I normal-
ize both variables so that each food is mean zero, standard deviation one, across regions.52
If tastes develop to favor crops well-suited to local resource endowments, the coeﬃcient on
relative endowments, b1, should be positive. In an alternative, supply driven, induced agri-
cultural innovation story (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971; Acemoglu, 2002), consumption rises
due to price declines in the locally abundant good. Therefore, I should ﬁnd no correlation
49Crop data can only be matched to 45 of the 52 goods, with animal products unmatched.
50Equation 5 resembles a test of the Rybczynski theorem. A more structural estimation in the context
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is shown in table D.1. I include an additional factor, population density, and
assume both an equal number of goods as factors and factor price equalization in productivity equivalent
units (necessitating a control for the real agricultural wage).
51This is an IV regression with over 300 instruments. I use the LIML Fuller-k estimator (c=1), as it is
robust to a large number of weak instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is 3.2, higher than
the Stock and Yogo (2002) 5 percent critical value of around 1.6 for rejecting the null of weak instruments.
52I also run a three-stage estimator by including the crop shares instrumented by agro-climatic endow-
ments directly in my demand system, equation 4. By restricting the coeﬃcient on endowmentgr to be
identical across the 52 regressions, I ﬁnd a hugely signiﬁcant positive relationship between (unnormalized)
endowments and the unexplained component of demand (coeﬃcient of 0.17, t-statistic of 14298). The coeﬃ-
cients are not directly comparable to the two-stage results as I do not normalize variables in this speciﬁcation.





Note: Dependent variable, tastes, estimated using unexplained regional variation in food budget shares.
Tastes normalized by crop. Endowment comprises the predicted values from regressing normalized crop
shares on 7 monthly crop-speciﬁc rainfall and temperature variables and altitude. Two-stage estimation
using LIML. Robust standard errors. Constant not reported. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
between tastes and endowments, as my taste measure picks up the demand variation that
wan not attributable to price variation in my demand system.53
Table 1 presents the results of the two-stage regression. My habit formation hypothesis is
supported:54 Regions which have climates relatively suited to growing a certain food have
larger tastes for that food, compared to other regions. In particular, a one standard deviation
increase in the relative agro-climatic endowment is associated with tastes that are 1.7 stan-
dard deviations higher. Tables D.1 and D.2 show similar results using the alternative taste
and price measures discussed in section 3.2.55 Within India, tastes have become correlated
with relative endowments when I estimate tastes using the unexplained regional variation in
budget shares controlling for local price eﬀects that are common across India.
I assumed in my theoretical model that habit formation did not bid up the prices of the
53There are several other explanations for a positive b1: First, my taste estimates may reﬂect regional
quality diﬀerences, and high quality technologies for a food developed in regions with more suitable endow-
ments via induced technical change. However, the quality diﬀerences between basic foodstuﬀs are generally
small and in the next section I ﬁnd that tastes are inversely correlated with prices. Such a correlation would
only occur if the technical change led to absolutely lower prices alongside higher quality, and could only
be maintained if there were enormous trade barriers across India for both food and technologies. Secondly,
agro-climatic conditions may have initially attracted migrants with well-suited tastes. However, in section
5 I ﬁnd that migrants in India do not move to regions ideally suited to their tastes. Finally, exogenously
tastier crops may have been adapted to grow better in the local agro-climatic conditions. However, in this
pure adaptation story there would be no correlation between tastes and historic agro-climatic conditions.
54The error term may be spatially correlated. I use the latitude and longitude of each region to apply
the correction suggested by Conley (1999). The correction is only available for the GMM estimator, and
both here, and in the later OLS regional regressions, the correction actually increases precision.
55These robustness checks address the concern that prices are poorly measured and my tastes are just
picking up unmeasured price variation. Reassuringly, I obtain similar results when I use the estimated
tastes of inter-state migrant households in place of their origin-state tastes. However, as migration data are
only recorded at the state rather than regional level, the sample size falls and the standard errors increase
substantially, and so the coeﬃcient on agro-climatic endowment is similar in magnitude yet insigniﬁcant.
28Table 2: Correlations Between Tastes and Prices
Pearson’s product-moment correlation
Pricesgr [95 Percent Conf. Interval]
tastesgr -0.093*** -0.125 -0.061
Note: 3670 observations. Tastes estimated using unexplained regional variation in food budget shares.
Prices are regional median unit values. Both variables normalized by good. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent,
** 5, *** 1. Conﬁdence intervals based on Fisher’s transformation.
region’s relatively abundant foods so much that these foods actually became relatively ex-
pensive compared to other regions. Under this assumption, trade liberalization raises the
relative price of preferred foods. I can verify whether this assumption holds for India by
calculating the correlation between tastes and prices. There is no causation implied, with
historic agro-climatic endowments the root determinant of both prices and tastes.
Table 2 reports this correlation, again normalizing tastes and prices separately by food.
Tastes are inversely correlated with prices, so that a region in which a food is more preferred
has a lower price for that food compared to other regions. Together with the endowment
results above, both hypothesis 1 and assumption 1 are supported, namely that tastes are
correlated with relative endowments and inversely correlated with prices. If India were to
liberalize internal trade so that prices equalize across India, locally more preferred foods will
systematically rise in price and less preferred foods will fall.
4.2 Preference changes correlate inversely with past price changes
The results of the previous section are consistent with my theory of habit formation that
links tastes to resource endowments. However, I can test this mechanism more directly by
verifying that taste changes over time relate to past changes in relative prices.
My habit formation assumption implies that relative tastes among foods respond to the
relative price changes in the previous generation. As I do not have comparable historic price
data, I draw on other thick rounds of the NSSO surveys going back to 1983. In order to
make full use of the time period spanned by the data, I estimate two new sets of taste pa-
rameters using the 2004-05 and 1993-94 cross-sections and normalize tastes over the 52 foods
separately for each region and time period. I regress the change in these relative tastes for
29Table 3: Taste Changes and Price Changes Between 1993-94 and 2004-05
(1) ∆05,94relative tastesgr (2)








Note: Dependent variable ∆05,94relative tastesgr is the change in the taste coeﬃcient, normalized mean
0, s.d. 1, for each region in each period. tastesgr estimated using unexplained regional variation in food
budget shares. ∆t2,t1 lnpgr are log changes in regional median unit values between t1 and t2. Robust
standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
a food within a region over this decade, ∆05,94relative tastesgr, on the log change in prices
for that food in that region over the previous decade, ∆94,83 lnpgr:
∆05,94relative tastesgr = b0 + b1∆94,83 lnpgr + εgr.
Table 3 reports the results of this regression. The coeﬃcient on the change in log price is
negative, with foods becoming less preferred when in the previous decade their price rose,
compared to other foods in the region. In the second column, I include the contemporaneous
price change from 1993-94 to 2004-05, ∆05,94 lnpgr. These price changes would be too recent
to aﬀect preferences in my habit formation model. Indeed, I ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
on contemporaneous price changes.56 This evidence suggests that the positive correlation
between tastes and endowments found in the previous section resulted in part through habit
formation, in which preferences responded to relative prices over many generations.57
4.3 Caloric intake declines with the correlation of tastes and price changes
I now show that if prices rise in more preferred foods, as the results of section 4.1 imply,
there will be negative caloric consequences. In particular, I test my fourth hypothesis: The
56This coeﬃcient may be biased upwards, leading to a spurious insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, as demand
shocks may increase both ∆05,94 lnpgr and ∆05,94relative tastesgr.
57An alternative explanation is that consumers purchase complementary stocks of durables which leads
to behavior indistinguishable from habit formation. This is not plausible for food choices over decades,
since food preparation equipment costs relatively little and can be used with a variety of foods.
30greater the correlation between tastes and price changes, the more caloric intake decreases,
conditional upon total food expenditure and the relative price per calorie. I examine the
price and caloric changes that occurred between my main sample period, 1987-88, and the
most recent sample, 2004-05, over the 76 regions sampled in both periods.58
I require a speciﬁcation for how tastes and price changes impact caloric intake, and my re-
gression speciﬁcation comes directly from equation 2, the log linearization of caloric change.
I separate the taste eﬀects from the relative price per calorie eﬀects by taking ﬁrst order
Taylor expansions around the average budget share and the average inverse relative price
per calorie, Jgr = (foodr/caloriesr)/pgr.59 This expansion suggests regressing caloric change
on the regional sum of tastes interacted with price changes:







+ b3∆lnfoodr + b4
52 X
g=1
(Jgr − Jr)∆lnpgr + εr. (7)
I measure ∆lncaloriesr by the log change in the mean total calories consumed per per-
son per day in region r, and ∆lnfoodr by the log change in the mean monthly total food
expenditure per person in region r.
If the approximation is reasonable, there are sign predictions on the population-averaged
slope coeﬃcients. The change in regional caloric intake should decline with a measure of the
correlation between tastes and price changes,
P52
g=1tastesgr∆lnpgr, (b1 < 0). There should
be a similar eﬀect for the explained component of the budget share, (b2 < 0). Additionally,
the change in regional caloric intake should increase with larger increases in food expenditure,
(b3 > 0), and when expensive calorie sources rise in price the most, (b4 > 0).
58The two rounds are suﬃciently far apart to observe signiﬁcant changes in relative prices within regions,
comparable to a trade liberalization. I obtain similar results for the regressions using other rounds of data.
The price changes over this period were not related to comparative advantage, as there was little internal
liberalization over the period, as discussed in appendix A. Regions with larger endowments and tastes for a
good actually saw smaller price rises, perhaps due to vote maximizing local politicians attempting to keep
their region’s preferred local foods aﬀordable for poor voters.
59The expansion is ∆lncaloriesr ' ∆lnfoodr − Jr
P52




31Table 4: Caloric Change and the Correlation of Tastes with Temporal Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆lncaloriesr 1987-88 to 2004-05
(Unweighted) (Weighted) (Weighted, Excluding Farmers)
Full Sample Poorest Quarter <2000 Calories
52 P
g=1
tastesgr∆lnpgr -0.354*** -0.600*** -0.556*** -0.364***
(0.11) (0.083) (0.10) (0.082)
52 P
g=1
hg(Pr,foodr)∆lnpgr -0.296** -0.566*** -0.648*** -0.382***
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.099)
∆lnfoodr 0.595*** 0.732*** 0.603*** 0.371***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.066) (0.062)
52 P
g=1
(Jgr − Jr)∆lnpgr 2.828* 1.942* 3.571 1.542*
(1.60) (1.16) (2.54) (0.78)
Constant -0.383*** -0.258*** -0.136 -0.0417
(0.11) (0.078) (0.11) (0.058)
Observations 76 76 75 75
R2 0.58 0.71 0.61 0.50
Note: Dependent variable is log change in caloric intake per person between 1987-88 and 2004-05. Indepen-
dent variables come from log linearizing caloric intake. Tastes estimated using unexplained regional variation
in food budget shares. Jgr is inverse relative price per calorie. Where indicated, regressions weighted by a
region’s total survey weight in 1987-88. Robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
Subsamples are the poorest quartile by region, and those consuming fewer than 2000 calories per person per
day, excluding any household who reports self-employment in agriculture as primary activity.
Table 4 reports the results of regression 7.60 Column 1 contains unweighted estimates
of the average regional coeﬃcients. In column 2, the coeﬃcients are representative of the
Indian population as a whole. Over the period, the average Indian caloric intake from the 52
foods declined from 2,200 to 2,000 calories per day. This decline was larger in regions where
price changes over the period correlated more strongly with tastes (b1 signiﬁcantly less than
zero).61 Table 4 also provides strong support for the other three sign predictions.
60The tastes are themselves estimated, which generates additional error that should be added to the
standard errors reported in table 4. Therefore, I bootstrap the household sample 1000 times, estimating tastes
and running regression 7 each time. However, the additional error generated through the taste estimation is
minuscule, with the standard error on b1 increasing by less than 0.005. There is also no evidence that ˆ b1 is
attenuated, with the mean value of ˆ b1 from the bootstrap almost exactly equal to the observed coeﬃcient.
61This result is not simply coming from larger aggregate price rises in some regions. Results, shown in
tables D.5 and D.6, are similar when the price changes are demeaned by region or when a correlation is used.
32Appendix D discusses and shows the results of three important robustness checks: I show
that households reduce non-food expenditure in response to rising prices for more favored
foods, however, the reallocation is not suﬃcient to maintain caloric intake. I relax the enve-
lope theorem assumption that budget shares are ﬁxed in the short run. Finally, I instrument
for ∆lnfoodr with ∆lnnon foodr to bound any bias from food expenditure being correlated
with shocks to caloric demand. In all cases, my results carry through.
Poor and undernourished households may put a higher weight on calories, relative to taste
considerations, compared to wealthier households. Additionally, the theoretical model un-
ambiguously predicts an increase in caloric intake at the time of trade liberalization for net
producers of rice when the price of rice rises with trade liberalization. Therefore, by restrict-
ing my sample further to only the households who are either not working in the agricultural
sector at all or are landless agricultural laborers,62 I can determine the caloric elasticities
for the key groups whose health is most likely to suﬀer permanent damage from a decline in
caloric intake at the time of liberalization.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 shows that the data support the conjecture that the caloric
intake of the poor and undernourished responds less elastically to relative food price changes.
The b1 coeﬃcients for the two subgroups of non-farmers who either fall in the poorest quartile
of each region or consume fewer than 2000 calories per person per day (already substantially
below the recommended intake of 2400 calories) are 0.56 and 0.36 respectively, compared
to 0.60 for the full sample.63 In section 6, I calculate the potential impact of internal trade
liberalization in India on the consumption side, which provides a sense of the magnitude
of these estimates. The predicted caloric impacts for these subgroups and the average ru-
ral Indian turn out to be very similar, as poor households have lower elasticities but much
stronger tastes for the local foods that are expected to rise in price.
Putting the three central empirical results together, I have shown that tastes positively
62I exclude all households who report self-employment in agriculture as their primary activity.
63I estimate new tastes coeﬃcients for each subgroup. Membership of these groups is clearly endogenous.
However, since I only have a repeated cross-section, such problems are unavoidable, and the results still
provide useful insights into the heterogeneous responses of important subpopulations.
33relate to relative endowments through habit formation, and that the correlation between
tastes and price changes reduces caloric intake for a given level of food expenditure. Con-
sequently, the caloric gains from trade liberalization will be muted and there may well be
absolute caloric losses as landless laborers continue to purchase their favored local foods that
have systematically risen in price.
5 Empirical Approach 2: Migrants as Small Open Economies
As further evidence for my hypotheses, I exploit spatial rather than temporal price dif-
ferences. Migrants move with their labor endowment and their origin-state tastes, and face
the prices of their destination state. This change mimics the experience of a household sud-
denly exposed to world prices upon trade liberalization. I verify that moving aﬀects migrants
similarly to how my model predicts trade liberalization aﬀects consumers in a small economy.
I use the complete 1987-88 cross section and I deﬁne inter-state migrants as households in
which either the household head or their spouse emigrated from another state in India.64 To
identify the causal caloric impacts of the price changes faced by a migrant, I must assume
that migrants do not diﬀer from non-migrants in unobservable ways, after controlling for
total food expenditure and other variables in the dataset.65
I avoid the most severe selection problems, those that arise when household heads are
choosing to migrate for better employment opportunities, by estimating all the regressions
using two additional speciﬁcations. In the "wife move" sample, I focus only on households in
which the wife of the household head moved speciﬁcally for the purpose of marriage (either
within or between states),66 and I compare households in which the wife moved inter-state
versus intra-state. Since Indian women typically live in their husband’s village upon mar-
riage, this covers about two-thirds of the wives in the dataset. The "wife move 2" sub-sample
64This is the only round that contains both detailed migration data and a full consumption module.
Many migrants move between rural and urban sectors, and so I now use both the rural and urban sample.
I carry out a state rather than region level analysis as the NSS data includes only the migrant’s state of
origin. If both head and spouse emigrated, I use the household head’s migration information.
65To produce my results, migrants need to consume higher price per calorie foods than non-migrants
with similar incomes for reasons unrelated to the tastes of their origin state. The prior may be that the
bias works in the other direction. For example, migrants may have unusually adaptable and adventurous
tastes or may be more likely to be manual laborers who consume diets heavy in cheap carbohydrates.
66I exclude the women who moved state jointly with their husbands at the time of marriage.
34restricts the set of observations even further, only selecting households in which the husband
still lives in the village of his birth and so the wife is likely to be moving into the extended
household of her husband’s family.67 Table D.8 in the appendix contains descriptive statis-
tics for these samples. Both of these strategies assume that the wife carries some of her
preferences into household food purchasing decisions, and that inter-state and intra-state
migrant wife households are identical after conditioning on the many observables.68
5.1 Migrants bring their tastes with them
The ﬁrst test veriﬁes that migrants maintain some of their origin-state’s tastes when they
move. This exercise provides evidence that, if India were to liberalize its internal agricultural
trade, local tastes would remain concentrated in local foods even after relative prices change.
In order to test this hypothesis, I ﬁrst calculate the mean food budget share spent on each
of the 52 foods in each of the 31 states. I then compute the correlation between the average
bundle of every state s and the bundle of every household. This produces 31 data points for
each household i, who originally lived in origin state o and now resides in destination state
d; ρiods = corrg(bshareig,bsharesg).69 I regress all of these ρiods correlations on ﬁve dummy
variables: the household lives in that state Id=s, the household lives in that state but is an
inter-state migrant Id=s,o6=s, the household does not live in that state Id6=s, the household
does not live in that state but originally migrated from there Id6=s,o=s and the household
does not live in that state but lives in a nearby state Id6=s,nearby=s:70
ρiods = b1Id=s + b2Id=s,o6=s + b3Id6=s + b4Id6=s,o=s + b5Id6=s,nearby=s + εis.
If migrants bring their origin-state tastes with them, then being a migrant reduces the
correlation between their consumption bundle and the average consumption bundle of their
destination state (b2 < 0), and increases the correlation with the average consumption bundle
67Inter-state migrant households comprise 8.0 percent of the full weighted sample, 7.3 percent of the wife
move sample and 5.4 percent of wife move 2 sample.
68Although Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) suggest that long distance marriages are a risk mitigating
mechanism, and so households who engage in inter-state marriages may have less variable expenditures.
69Since I create 31 data points from each household observation, I cluster standard errors at the household.
70As migrants usually come from nearby states and nearby states have similar diets, omitting Id6=s,nearby=s
would result in a spurious positive coeﬃcient on Id6=s,o=s. I group India into 5 zones, and deﬁne a nearby
state as one in the same zone. I ﬁnd similar results when controlling for the distance between states.
35Table 5: Comparing Bundles of Migrants and Non-Migrants
(1) (2) (3)
ρiods = corrg(bshareig,bsharesg)
Full Sample Wife Move Sample Wife Move 2 Sample
Idestination=s 0.811*** 0.805*** 0.804***
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Idestination=s,origin6=s -0.0210*** -0.0288*** -0.0251***
(0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0072)
Idestination6=s 0.483*** 0.450*** 0.447***
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Idestination6=s,origin=s 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.135***
(0.0042) (0.0063) (0.0079)
Idestination6=s,nearby=s 0.181*** 0.199*** 0.199***
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Observations 3,920,725 1,653,633 1,474,205
R2 0.77 0.75 0.74
Note: Dependent variable is correlation between household food budget shares and mean shares for state s
(31 observations per household). Independent variables are indicators for household’s origin o and current
(destination) d state. In the full sample there are 126,475 households of which 11,336 are migrants. Robust
standard errors. All regressions survey weighted and clustered further by household. * signiﬁcant at 10
percent, ** 5, *** 1.
of their origin state (b4 > 0). As shown in table 5, the data support these sign predictions for
all my samples.71 Column 1 shows that the bundle of an average household has a correlation
of 0.811 with its own state’s average bundle, and this falls to 0.790 for migrant households.
The correlation is only 0.483 with state bundles from other areas of India, but rises by 0.112
if they originally migrated from that state. Table D.9 shows very similar results when I
include a large number of additional controls. In conclusion, migrant households maintain
some of the preferences of their origin state after migration.
5.2 Migrants consume fewer calories for a given level of food expenditure
I now investigate whether migrants consume fewer calories than those that stayed behind,
controlling for total food expenditure. Since migrants’ tastes are no longer inversely cor-
71Reassuringly, I also ﬁnd that non-migrants’ bundles are more similar to their current state than to
other states (b1 > b3), and nearby states have more similar bundles than distant ones (b5 > 0). The positive
coeﬃcient on Id=s, is partly mechanical, as individual budget shares are a component of state mean budget
shares. However, this bias towards 1 is small as the average state sample contains 4,000 households.
36related with local prices, the foods they ﬁnd particularly tasty now cost relatively more.72
The expenditure controls absorb any income gain from moving (similar to the production
gains from trade). Therefore, this test provides evidence that the local tastes identiﬁed in
the previous section generate negative caloric impacts when prices change upon migration.
I regress caloric intake per person per day, caloriesi, on a migrant-household dummy,
migranti, ﬂexible controls for total food expenditure, foodi, an extensive set of demographic
and seasonal controls Zi and a full set of origin-state dummies, do:73





γodo + ΠZi + εi. (8)
As I include origin-state dummies, b1 picks up the diﬀerence in caloric intake between those
that stayed in the origin state and those that left. If the assumptions outlined at the start of
section 5 hold, this comparison is equivalent to comparing the caloric intake of households
in my model before and after trade liberalization, holding food expenditure constant.
Table 6 shows the results of this regression for the three samples. Inter-state migrants con-
sume fewer calories for a given level of food expenditure (b1 < 0),74 even when just comparing
inter-state to intra-state wife migrations in columns 2 and 3.75 Being an inter-state migrant
corresponds to the consumption of over 100 fewer calories per person per day controlling for
food expenditure, or about 5 percent of total caloric intake. This caloric loss is commensurate
72The preferred origin-state foods are relatively expensive in the destination state because prices and
tastes are inversely correlated (table 2). The same relationship holds across states, where the correlation
between normalized state-level tastes and median state prices is -0.08 (95 percent interval of -0.13 to -0.02).
73I use log food expenditure as food expenditure is distributed log normally (unlike caloric intake).
Additional controls are age variables, the education level of the household head, scheduled caste or tribe,
religion, main household activity and household composition variables. Migrants may be moving to
locations with higher prices for all goods. Accordingly, I also include dummies for urban-urban, rural-urban
and urban-rural migration. As a further check, table D.12 shows the regressions including a full set of
destination-sector dummies. Migrants still consume fewer calories when compared to non-migrants living
in their destination state and sector (rural or urban) whose tastes are adapted to the local prices (although
the magnitude of the caloric loss decreases by about one third).
74As with the regional regressions, I replace total food expenditure with total expenditure to check
for reallocation between food and non-food expenditure. The conditional caloric loss is reduced but only
slightly, as shown in tables D.10 and D.11. Results are unchanged, and available on request, when I
instrument food expenditure with non-food expenditure to control for potentially correlated measurement
error (calories and food expenditure are calculated using the same raw data).
75I would also ﬁnd b1 < 0 if wives from more distant villages are more prized and fed higher quality
foods. Alternatively, wives may be fed (or choose) cheaper calorie sources than other household members, as
well as wives from further away being fed less food (or control of a smaller share of the household budget).
37Table 6: Caloric Intake of Migrants Compared to Non-Migrants
(1) (2) (3)
Daily Calories Per Person caloriesi
Full Sample Wife Move Sample Wife Move 2 Sample
migranti -107.2*** -115.0*** -43.87**
(18.2) (17.0) (18.2)
lnfoodi -2777*** -3787*** -3959***
(963) (588) (630)
lnfood2
i 478.1*** 585.8*** 609.6***
(115) (67.1) (72.1)
Observations 124,578 52,836 47,501
R2 0.50 0.66 0.67
Note: Daily calories per person regressed on inter-state migrant dummy, log food expenditure terms,
origin-state dummies and controls Zi, with the full results shown in tables D.10 and D.11. Robust
standard errors. All regressions survey weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
with a 7 percent decline in food expenditure for the average Indian household.76
The caloric loss is smaller in the third column of table 6, where wives move to their hus-
band’s village of birth. These households are likely to be more traditional and contain other
members of the husband’s family. An out-of-state wife might be expected to have a smaller
caloric impact due to a lesser say in household food purchasing decisions. The fact that
a signiﬁcant negative caloric eﬀect remains implies that the isomorphic food technologies
story cannot account for these results alone as the extended family will be familiar with the
recipes and preparation techniques that take best advantage of the local foods.
Combining this evidence with the previous section suggests that migrant households con-
sume substantially fewer calories for a given level of food expenditure as they continue to
consume the favored products from their origin state that are now relatively expensive in their
destination state. I will perform a stronger test of hypothesis 4 shortly, and demonstrate that
the size of the caloric reduction for a given level of food expenditure depends on the particular
tastes of the migrant’s origin state and the price changes faced upon that speciﬁc migration.
76Tables D.10 and D.11 show that migrants do not actually consume fewer calories, as their food
expenditure is higher than those who stayed behind. Part of this derives from the production gains
from trade that made the large migration costs worthwhile (migrants have signiﬁcantly higher total food
expenditure yet consume approximately the same number of calories).
385.3 Caloric loss from migration shrinks over time
Migrant households’ tastes will gradually adapt to favor the relatively cheap goods in their
destination state through the process of habit formation, bringing caloric gains (hypothesis
2). I test this hypothesis by supplementing the previous regression speciﬁcation with the
length of time since a wife moved, interacted with whether the wife is an inter-state migrant:77
caloriesi = b1migranti + b2yrsawayi + b3(migranti × yrsawayi)




o γodo + ΠZi + εi.
Table 7 shows the results of this regression, which once more support the habit formation
hypothesis. For each additional year that an inter-state migrant wife lives in the destination
state, daily caloric intake per person for a given level of food expenditure rises by 2.7 calories
more than the rise experienced by an intra-state migrant wife (b3 > 0). The coeﬃcient is of a
similar magnitude for the wife move 2 speciﬁcation, but is no longer signiﬁcant. A crude es-
timate of the number of years required for the tastes of an inter-state wife’s household to fully
adapt is b1/b3, or between 80 and 96 years.78 Over many years and several generations, habit
formation alters tastes to favor locally cheap foods, and there are corresponding caloric gains.
I also include additional interaction terms, with the full results shown in table D.11. I ﬁnd
that the presence of a mother-in-law79 in the household increases caloric intake for a given
level of food expenditure, potentially through her experience at preparing and purchasing af-
fordable local foods. The eﬀect is even stronger in inter-state wife households, either because
the wife is less familiar with local foods and recipes, or because the wife has less inﬂuence
over purchasing decisions when a mother-in-law is present.80
77By focusing only on households in which the wives moved for marriage, I can control for caloric changes
that depend on the length of time since the wife moved for marriage, yrsawayi. This is necessary as the
time since the wife moved will be correlated with demographic unobservables.
78These are out of sample estimates and should be treated with caution, as the average time since
migration is only 20 years. This empirical strategy has no way of disentangling migrant-speciﬁc cohort
eﬀects eﬀects from time-since-migration eﬀects, as only the 1987-88 cross-section contains suitable migration
data (national cohort eﬀects will be absorbed in the yrsawayi term).
79I code motherlawi = 1 if a household head lives with their mother or mother-in-law. Given the Indian
norm of patrilocality (Srinivas, 1980), the majority of these women will be the husband’s mother.
80The second interaction term is the number of children. I ﬁnd that children reduce calories per person
since they require fewer calories than adults. However, for inter-state wife households, there is a positive net
39Table 7: Caloric Intake of Intra-State and Inter-State Wife Households Over Time
(1) (2)
Daily Calories Per Person caloriesi









Note: Daily calories per person regressed on an inter-state wife dummy, migranti, the years since a wife
moved village and years interacted with being an inter-state wife. Log food expenditure terms, controls
Zi and origin-state dummies omitted, with full results shown in table D.11. Robust standard errors. All
regressions survey weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
5.4 Caloric loss larger when tastes are correlated with price changes
In the ﬁnal test, I use the information on the actual migration route traveled and the
particular tastes of the migrant’s origin state. I show that the caloric loss is larger when the
relative price rises faced by a migrant moving from origin state o to destination state d are
more concentrated in the preferred origin-state foods of that migrant, controlling for food
expenditure. The speciﬁcation mirrors that used in section 4.3 in order to test hypothesis 4,
except here I use spatial price changes rather than temporal price changes within regions.
I rerun my migrant calorie regression, equation 8, except now rather than a single mi-
grant household dummy, I allow the migrant eﬀect to depend on the migrant’s origin and
destination state. I interact the migrant dummy with a measure of the correlation between
the migrant’s origin-state tastes and the relative price changes between the migrant’s origin
and destination states (
P52
g=1tastesgo∆lnpgod).81 The model predicts that migrants whose
origin-state tastes are especially well suited to their destination state’s prices should ex-
impact of children. If parents in my model have some foresight, they will partially adjust meals to include
inexpensive local foods so that their children develop tastes for these foods and beneﬁt as adults. Then, the
degree of adjustment will increase in the number of children, as I ﬁnd.
81Since I do not have historical price data, I use the price diﬀerences at the time of the survey, and must
assume there were similar relative price diﬀerences between states at whichever time the migrant moved.
40Table 8: Caloric Change and the Correlation of Tastes with Spatial Price Changes
(1) (2) (3)
Caloric Change with Migration (Controlling for Food Expenditure)
Full Sample Wife Move Sample Wife Move 2 Sample
52 P
g=1
tastesgo∆lnpgod -0.873*** -0.705*** -0.560***
×migranti (0.0598) (0.0672) (0.0841)
52 P
g=1
hgo(Po,foodo)∆lnpgod -0.864*** -0.759*** -0.733***
×migranti (0.0713) (0.0946) (0.127)
52 P
g=1
(Jgo − Jo)∆lnpgod -2.924* -6.597*** -9.597***
×migranti (1.765) (2.075) (2.598)
migranti -0.0209*** -0.00127 0.0200**
(0.00703) (0.00697) (0.00820)
Observations 124,578 52,812 47,482
Origin-Destination Pairs 484 341 256
R2 0.722 0.695 0.699
Note: Dependent variable is the log of caloric intake per person per day. Independent variables shown come
from the log linearization of caloric intake. Tastes estimated using unexplained state variation in food budget
shares. Jgr is the inverse relative price per calorie. Log food expenditure terms, controls Zi and origin-state
dummies omitted, with full results shown in table D.13. Robust standard errors. All regressions survey
weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
perience smaller caloric declines, controlling for food expenditure. Following the regional
speciﬁcation 7, I use log calories and also include two additional terms that control for the
relative price per calorie and the explained component of demand:















γodo + ΠZi + εi.
The sample size is much larger than the regional regression, with 484 observed origin-
destination migration routes. As before, I use price data and estimate taste parameters
for 1987-88, but now by state rather than by region.
Table 8 shows the results of this regression. The greater the correlation between origin
tastes and the price changes faced on individual migration routes, the larger the decline in the
41number of calories obtained from a given level of food expenditure (b1 < 0). These coeﬃcients
are slightly larger than those estimated from temporal price variation across regions. The
fact that the results are of the same sign and order of magnitude provides strong evidence
that caloric intake is negatively impacted when tastes correlate with price changes.
6 The Caloric Impact of Internal Trade Liberalization in India
In this section, I use my previous empirical results to predict the nutritional impacts of
the taste heterogeneity that I document within India if internal agricultural trade were lib-
eralized, such that prices equalize across regions.82 Appendix A details the many current
restraints to agricultural trade within India.
I calculate the predicted caloric loss on the consumption side coming from regional tastes
correlating with these equalizing price changes, and the rise in total food expenditure that
would be required to avoid absolute caloric losses. These estimates can be contrasted with
the predicted caloric loss from the same price changes if regional tastes were equal to the
average Indian tastes, and were independent of regional endowments.83 Comparing these
two numbers provides an estimate of the bias on the consumption side from ignoring taste
diﬀerences when predicting the nutritional impact of agricultural trade liberalization.
To proceed, I use the more conservative estimate of the elasticity of caloric change with
the correlation between tastes and price changes, b b1, from the weighted regional regres-
sion. Under the assumption that all regions have the same elasticity, the predicted caloric





gr. I use regional taste estimates for rural households from the most
recent thick NSSO survey (2004-05). For the predicted equalizing price changes, ∆lnplib
gr,
I use the log diﬀerence between the Indian median price and the median price in region
82If high transport costs are a major contributor to the lack of agricultural market integration, then
these estimates are relevant to a reform process that includes substantial infrastructure investments.
83This counterfactual only addresses the eﬀects of habit formation on the consumption side as autarky
prices, and hence price changes upon liberalization, would diﬀer in a society without habit formation.
Unfortunately, this cannot be veriﬁed because of the impossibility of observing autarky prices in the absence
of habit formation. Habit formation may also change the distribution of these reduced production gains.
However, investigating these production side eﬀects requires data that span a period of agricultural trade
liberalization.
42Table 9: The Negative Caloric Impact on Rural Households Coming From Tastes Being
Correlated with the Price Changes at the Time of Indian Internal Trade Liberalization
(1) (2) (3)
All-India Predicted Means Actual Tastes Identical Tastes Diﬀerence
\ ∆lncaloriesr -0.0265* -0.00364 -0.0229***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.0037)
∆lnfood expend. to avoid caloric loss 0.0362 0.0050 0.0312
∆lnexpenditure to avoid caloric loss 0.0333 0.0046 0.0287
\ ∆lncaloriesr -0.0445*** -0.0163 -0.0282***
(Poorest Quartile, Excl. Farmers) (0.015) (0.016) (0.0034)
∆lnfood expend. to avoid caloric loss -0.0739 -0.0270 -0.0468
\ ∆lncaloriesr -0.0209 0.0007 -0.0216***
(<2000 Calories, Excl. Farmers) (0.018) (0.019) (0.0033)
∆lnfood expend. to avoid caloric loss -0.0564 0.00189 -0.0583
Note: 77 observations weighted by a region’s total survey weight. \ ∆lncalorier is the predicted log
change in calories on the consumption side coming from regional tastes correlating with equalizing price
changes in India using data from 2004-2005. Robust standard errors for means. * signiﬁcant at 10
percent, ** 5, *** 1.
r, again from 2004-05.84 For the counterfactual society, in which tastes are independent
of endowments, I assume that tastes are identical across regions and equal to the average
Indian tastes for each good, tastesg. In this case, the predicted reduction coming from tastes
correlating with price changes is \ ∆lncaloriesNHF




The results shown in table 9 suggest that, holding total food expenditure constant, there
will be an average caloric loss of 2.7 percent coming from the correlation between tastes and
price changes (about 54 calories per person per day). With identical tastes across India, the
caloric loss from this channel would be essentially zero. The estimated coeﬃcient on total
food expenditure in regression 7 was 0.73. Therefore, trade will have to generate income
gains that increase average total food expenditure by 3.6 percent in order to compensate for
the caloric loss that comes from the correlation of tastes and price changes.85
Table 9 also shows the predicted eﬀects of trade-induced equalizing price changes on the
hungriest and poorest subgroups discussed in section 4.3. The negative caloric impacts are
84These are the median prices paid by the consumers who actually purchase the good.
85Using the coeﬃcients from table D.7, 3.3 percent total expenditure gains are required.
43Figure 5: The Predicted Caloric Losses from Liberalization and Regional Expenditure


























































Regional Log Total Expenditure (Monthly Rupees Per Person)
of a similar magnitude to those found for the full sample, despite lower caloric elasticities for
these subgroups. Poor and malnourished households have less diversiﬁed diets and accord-
ingly developing stronger tastes for the relatively cheap local foods that rise in price at the
time of liberalization. These stronger tastes for local foods negate the subgroups’ smaller
caloric elasticities for a given set of tastes and price changes. While the caloric impacts are
similar, the compensating food expenditure increases are larger than for the full sample, as
these subpopulations’ caloric intakes were less responsive to food expenditure changes.
In geographic terms, the negative caloric impacts that come from tastes correlating with
price changes will not be spread uniformly across India. Figure 5 plots the predicted caloric
loss from internal trade liberalization, holding food expenditure constant, against the mean
per-capita expenditure of the region in 2004-05. There is a highly signiﬁcant positive slope,
with poorer regions more likely to suﬀer caloric losses on the consumption side, with pre-
dicted caloric losses of 20 percent in some of the poorest regions.86 A similar relationship is
86The ﬁgure implicitly assumes that the elasticity of caloric change with respect to the correlation
between price changes and tastes is not smaller in poorer regions. Table D.14 runs regression 7 separately
44shown in appendix ﬁgure D.1 for the non-farmers who consume fewer than 2000 calories per
day . The poorer regions spend larger portions of their incomes on local staple foods, and so
will be harder hit on the consumption side when comparative advantage foods rise in price.87
Therefore, caloric inequality across India will increase unless agricultural trade liberalization
brings the largest income gains to the hungriest rural households in the poorest regions.
The magnitudes of these required income gains on the consumption side are large enough
to raise the concern that the static production gains may be insuﬃcient to avoid caloric losses
for some key groups at the time of internal trade liberalization. For example, general equilib-
rium trade models have been used to estimate the production gains from agricultural trade
liberalization that come through greater specialization. Anderson and Valenzuela (2007)
predict that full liberalization of world agricultural trade would result in the value added by
farmers increasing by only 0.3 percent for lower-income developing countries.88 In table 9, I
ﬁnd that for the poor and hungry landless laborers, food expenditure gains of 5.6 to 7.4 per-
cent will be required just to maintain caloric intake, with even larger numbers in the poorest
regions of the country. These households are the most at risk from malnutrition, and so
caloric declines are the most damaging for these groups, and at the same time their incomes
would not be expected to rise as much as those of landed farmers growing the local compara-
tive advantage crops. Combining these require food expenditure gains with the low estimates
of the static income gains from trade reported above suggests that absolute caloric losses for
rural landless laborers are quite possible if India liberalized internal agricultural trade.
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
International trade theory generally assumes that tastes are identical across regions and
independent of endowments. In this paper, I show that habit formation in food consump-
for richer and poorer regions. The elasticity is actually larger in poorer regions, suggesting an even more
skewed regional distribution than that shown in ﬁgure 5. I ﬁnd a similarly signiﬁcant relationship when I
deﬂate expenditure by a Stone price index with national budget shares. However, it is not clear whether
any price index makes sense when tastes diﬀer across regions.
87The regional mean per-capita expenditure has a strongly negative correlation of -0.52 with the budget
share spent on foods that are expected to rise in price with liberalization (95 percent conﬁdence interval be-
tween -0.67 and -0.34). This result is partly driven poorer regions having lower agricultural prices on average.
88India in particular would suﬀer a 2.3 percent decline coming from reduced domestic protection, although
Indian farmers would see an increase in their value added of 3.2 percent if India had no existing tariﬀs.
45tion leads to regional food tastes that favor crops relatively well-suited to local agro-climatic
endowments. This connection erodes the short-run caloric gains from trade liberalization on
both the production side (by bringing autarky prices together) and the consumption side
(by limiting the substitution out of foods that rise in price at the time of liberalization).
I verify the empirical relevance of the consumption side of the model by exploring India’s
non-integrated domestic agricultural markets. Regional tastes, measured by the unexplained
regional variation in household demand for agricultural products, correlate positively with
agro-climatic endowments and negatively with local prices. These tastes respond over time
to past relative prices as habit formation would suggest. Finally, caloric intake declines more
in regions where price rises are more concentrated in locally favored foods, controlling for
changes in food expenditure. I conﬁrm these results by looking at the consumption patterns
of inter-state migrants within India, who obtain fewer calories for a given level of food ex-
penditure as their favored foods cost more outside their origin state. This eﬀect dissipates
over time, and the caloric intake from a given level of food expenditure declines more where
price rises are more concentrated in migrants’ preferred origin-state foods.
My ﬁndings imply that if India were to liberalize its internal agricultural trade, the prices of
preferred foods will rise in each region. Consumers are reluctant to substitute away from these
foods, and trade must generate larger income gains in order to avoid caloric losses, as com-
pared to a society without habit formation. Poor and hungry landless households, who con-
sume larger shares of local staple foods, will be especially hard hit through this mechanism.
These results have important policy implications. If agricultural trade liberalization re-
duces the caloric intake of the poor, from levels already bordering on malnutrition, there will
be serious consequences as it is impossible to compensate later in life for nutritional short-
falls while young. The most harmful nutritional impacts can be avoided by accompanying
agricultural liberalization with temporary food subsidies for favored local staples, speciﬁcally
targeted at households on the edge of malnourishment. Many developing countries already
have food subsidy systems in place, such as the Public Distribution System in India, making
46this measure easy to implement. As was the case with the introduction of the potato in
Europe, governments can also take direct measures to encourage the adoption of foods made
relatively cheap by trade, ensuring that the full caloric gains from trade arrive more quickly.
More recently, governments in South Asia have promoted sweet potato as an alternative
to rice in the production of noodles. Similar strategies were used extensively during the
Irish potato famine to increase the consumption of imported maize that many Irish initially
refused to eat, as they neither liked nor knew how to prepare it (Woodham-Smith, 1964).
Taking local taste diﬀerences seriously also has ramiﬁcations for estimating Computational
General Equilibrium models. These have become a common tool for policymakers to under-
stand the impacts of various trade liberalization scenarios. The use of home-biased Arming-
ton preferences, where consumers prefer domestic to foreign varieties of any good, has become
commonplace in order to match the observed trade ﬂows. Welfare eﬀects hinge critically on
the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic varieties, yet such preferences are
ad hoc and improbable for homogenous agricultural commodities. Developing my model of
habit formation that links local endowments with cross-price elasticities of substitution can
produce Armington-like results but with a ﬁrm theoretical grounding for agricultural goods.
Tastes matter for trade. Neglecting their role overstates the caloric gains from agricultural
trade liberalization, and masks potential nutritional losses for the poorest members of society.
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50Appendices (Not For Publication)
A Background on Agricultural Trade in India
I brieﬂy review the current state of Indian agricultural trade before assessing the potential
impact of domestic liberalization. Despite wide ranging economic reforms over the last two
decades, India’s agricultural sector remains highly restricted. While there has been new legis-
lation at the national (Union) level to liberalize domestic markets, these measures have been
applied erratically at best because agricultural policy is under the exclusive constitutional
remit of state governments.1
Interventionist food policies were initially enacted in response to the perceived failures of
private trade in the Bengal famine of 1943. The Essential Commodities Act (1955) entitles
both governments and states to impose restrictions on "trade and commerce in, and the
production, supply and distribution of foodstuﬀs."2 Other agricultural acts control to whom
farmers and traders are allowed to sell and at what price. All traders require licenses, have
restricted access to credit and must follow over 400 rules that govern food trade (Planning
Commisson of India, 2001).
Internal trade is further restrained through state tariﬀs and district-level entry taxes, Oc-
troi, collected at often corrupt checkpoints (Das-Gupta, 2006). This is in addition to the
extremely poor transport infrastructure across India, which is perhaps the biggest hindrance
to trading bulky agricultural goods within the country. State governments are also directly
involved in the purchase and sale of food. The Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices
sets minimum support prices for farmers that are only available in certain regions, while
state levies require private mills to supply grain at a ﬁxed price, which is then sold to the
poor through the Public Distribution System at prices chosen by each state. Jha et al. (2005)
discuss these numerous restrictions in more detail, and show that as a result wholesale rice
markets across India are not integrated. The lack of integration is evident in the NSS data,
in which the dispersion of regional prices actually increased between 1987-88 and 2004-05.3
1For example, the Agricultural Produce Marketing Acts was amended in 2003 to allow farmers to sell
their produce directly to buyers for the ﬁrst time. Only about half of the states have so far incorporated
the amendment and in most cases with substantial changes.
2FAO (2005) details some of the numerous state-level and even district-level restrictions that remain.
3The average over 52 foods of the cross-regional coeﬃcients of variation of rural median food prices rose
from 0.51 in 1987-88 to 0.53 in 2004-05. Similarly, the average pairwise correlation between the median
prices of the 52 foods in any two regions declined from 0.85 to 0.83 between the two surveys.
1Although there has been little progress reforming the domestic market, if India had fully
liberalized all external trade, the domestic agricultural market would have become integrated.
However, external agricultural trade has only seen limited reform in the years following In-
dia’s 1991 liberalization. The initial tariﬀ reductions did not cover agricultural goods at
all. The impetus for agricultural liberalization came from the Agreement on Agriculture,
which India committed to as a founding member of the WTO. This agreement required the
conversion of all non-tariﬀ barriers and quantitative restrictions into tariﬀs by 2002, but
left domestic support untouched. However, tariﬀ levels were set suﬃciently high to choke
imports in all but pulses and oilseeds.4 As a result, the FAO (2003) reports that there was
little impact from the liberalization of agricultural trade under the Agreement on Agriculture
between 1997 and 2002.5
India still maintains high tariﬀs, agricultural import monopolies, state trading enterprises
and export restrictions that maintain a "highly interventionist agricultural development pol-
icy regime" (Athukorala, Prema-chandra, 2005). Accordingly, alongside the domestic re-
straints detailed above, agricultural trade within India remains highly restricted, and internal
markets are far from integrated.6
B Data Sources
The NSSO data used in both empirical sections of the paper are described in section
3.1. To measure agricultural endowments, I use district-level agricultural data from Indian
Harvest produced by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, aggregated up to NSSO
regions. Further regional data come from the Indian District Database (Vanneman and
Barnes, 2000) and the India Agriculture and Climate Data Set (Sanghi et al., 1998), while
weather data come from Willmott and Matsuura (2001).
C A Simple Model of Habit Formation and Trade
C.1 Proof of Hypothesis 1:
In the speciﬁc factors model, the proof that preferences become correlated with relative
resource endowments proceeds as follows. The production functions for rice and wheat have
constant returns to scale and diminishing returns. One unit of each good provides one calorie.
I will ﬁrst model the production side of the economy. The population is divided into la-
borers and factor (land) owners. Each labor owner possesses one unit of labor and there is L
total labor in the economy. The distribution of rice land, Tr, and wheat land, Tw, among the
4In these two categories India is not self-suﬃcient and the government itself controls a substantial portion
of imports via government agencies. According to (Gulati, 1998), the Indian Government followed the
following rule: "Allow imports if there was a net deﬁcit and allow exports if there was a comfortable surplus."
5Agricultural exports did, however, respond positively to the 20 percent devaluation of the rupee in 1991.
6Therefore, my theoretical mechanism cannot explain the decline in caloric intake that has occurred
across India in the last 20 years. In fact relative prices across regions have moved in the opposite direction
to that suggested by relative endowments. For example rice was already relatively cheap in large rice
growing areas, and has become more so over the reform period.
2population will be left unmodelled. Qr and Qw are the outputs of the two goods produced




















I normalize the price of wheat to 1:
pw = 1,pr = p.
Labor is divided between rice and wheat production and factor clearing implies that all the
labor in the economy is exhausted. Labor is free to move between the two sectors and so
marginal returns in the two sectors are equalized:
































The speciﬁc factors Tw and Tr are ﬁxed over generations. However, I calculate the derivatives









































I deﬁne the relative production of rice, r, as z. Individual producers take prices as given,
and so I can calculate the relative supply response to price changes, as well as to diﬀering










































































































I now turn to modelling the demand side of the economy. I assume demand is homothetic
so that the distribution of factors across the economy does not impact relative consump-
tion decisions. Relative tastes for rice, tastesr, increase the budget share spent on rice,
3bsharer = θr, conditional on the relative rice price:
θr = tastesr + hr(p) where h
0
r(p) ≤ 0.
I deﬁne the relative consumption of r as γ. Individual consumers take prices as given, and so I












r(p) − θr((1 − θr) − ph0
r(p))





p(1 − θr)2 > 0.
Market clearing equilibrates relative supply and demand under autarky, with the equilib-




I will use the derivatives calculated for relative supply and demand to assess the impact of
relative endowments on prices and tastes.7
Two diﬀerent regions at the beginning of time have the same preferences that favor each
good equally and technologies are identical in the two sectors. Region 1 is endowed with
T +x units of rice growing land Tr and T units of wheat growing land Tw. Region 2 has the
reverse relative endowments, nT units of rice growing land Tr and n(T + x) units of wheat
growing land Tw. The population of region 1 is L, while region 2 has a population of nL.
Region 2 is much bigger than region 1 as n is large.
In a hypothetical economy with the balanced endowments, T = Tw = Tr, raising the en-
dowment of Tr to region 1’s initial endowment will raise the relative production of rice since
dz
dTr > 0, bringing the economy out of equilibrium. The price will have to fall to reduce the
relative production and raise the relative consumption of rice until equilibrium is reestab-
lished because dz
dp > 0 and
dγ
dp < 0. The opposite eﬀect will occur when the endowment of
Tw is increased to obtain region 2’s initial endowment.8 Therefore in the ﬁrst generation,
the region where rice is relatively abundant consumes relatively more rice and has a lower
relative price for rice.
Tastes for rice, tastesr,t, change over generations t through the process of habit forma-
tion. They are positively related to the past generation’s relative consumption through adult







7These were partial equilibrium derivatives as I did not impose equality between relative supply and
relative demand until now.
8The homogenous of degree one production functions mean that the two regions are comparable since
the scaling factor n only aﬀects absolute quantities, not the relative measures referred to here.
4In the second generation, habit formation increases the tastes for rice in region 1 (the rela-
tively rice abundant region) compared to region 2, as γa
t−1 is larger in region 1.9
This proves hypothesis 1: A region develops tastes inversely related to the relative prices
it faces. Therefore, tastes will become positively correlated with a region’s relative resource
endowments.
C.2 Existence of Steady State with Ps < 1:
For the existence of a steady state I require that a ﬁxed point exists where relative con-




For stability and a steady state which converges without oscillating, an increase in tastes
today must lead to a less than proportional increase in tastes tomorrow, as tastes approach









I assume such a ﬁxed point exists and is stable, and that the steady state has a price less
than 1 and so is an interior steady state where both rice and wheat continue to be consumed.





These conditions are characterized for the Cobb-Douglas case in appendix C.5.
C.3 Proof of Hypothesis 2:
Assuming the rise in the rice price necessary to equilibrate the economy is not so large
that p rises above the hypothetical balanced-endowment economy’s autarky price of p = 1,
tastes in period 2 will be inversely correlated with autarky prices. The aggregate caloric
maximum is at p = 1, found by setting dcalories
dr = 0 along the edge of the production possi-
bilities frontier. Caloric intake increases with a rise in p up to that point as the production
possibilities frontier is concave.






= 1 − p
The rice price increases in region 1 with habit formation, as the increased tastes for rice
raise demand for rice. The rice price was initially below 1 and therefore the aggregate
caloric intake increases with habit formation as long as rice remains relatively cheap (p < 1).
9This increases the relative consumption of rice, bringing about a price response (since endowments are
ﬁxed). To bring production into equilibrium, the price of rice must rise as dz
dp > 0 and
dγ
dp < 0.
5C.4 Proof of Hypothesis 3:
Region 1 integrates with the much larger region 2, and takes region 2’s prices as given at
the time of trade liberalization. Post trade values are superscripted with an asterisk. The
new world price is p∗ > 1. Tastes are ﬁxed and I look only at region 1 and the generation ini-
tially aﬀected by trade liberalization. Upon trade liberalization, rice is now relatively more
expensive (p∗ > 1) and caloric intake increases in wheat consumption. With an exogenous
world price, the consumption decision can be separated from the production decision and
relative consumption is determined by
γ =
tastesrt + hr(p∗)












































With habit formation, steady state tastesrs favor rice, and so caloric intake is lower than
if tastes were neutral as in the ﬁrst generation (without habit formation, the neutral tastes
of the ﬁrst generation, tastesr1 = 1
2, are also the tastes of every subsequent generation).
The relatively higher consumption of rice reduces caloric intake compared to the no habit
formation society facing the same world price p∗ and hence the same budget set.
The autarky price in region 2 will also be reduced by habit formation (as tastes for wheat
bid up the price of wheat). Therefore, the caloric intake post trade in a world without habits
will be even larger than if the post trade price was p∗, as wheat will be even cheaper at the
time of liberalization and the greater production gains from trade will allow consumption at
a point beyond that obtainable in the habit formation world:
dcalories∗






















Habit formation increased the aggregate caloric intake of each generation up to the steady
state generation s (hypothesis 2). Therefore, since aggregate caloric intake was lower pre
trade and higher post trade without habit formation, this implies that habit formation re-
duces both the aggregate caloric gains from trade as well as the caloric elasticities with
respect to trade liberalization.
This proves hypothesis 3 for the case where p∗ > 1: Habit formation reduces the short-run
6aggregate caloric elasticities with respect to trade liberalization.
If p∗ = 1 in both the habit and no habit worlds, the caloric intake post trade is identical,
but was higher pre trade with habit formation so that the absolute gains and elasticities are
also reduced. If ps < p∗ < 1, the impact is ambiguous, although the change in caloric intake
and the caloric elasticity are still likely to be reduced as long as the relative endowment Tr
Tw
is not very close to 1, as the economy-wide production gains are much smaller with habit
formation (as ps is higher than the autarky price without habit formation, p1).
C.5 Characterization of the Steady State with Cobb-Douglas Functional Forms
Here I solve the model outlined in the theory section with speciﬁc functional forms. For
simplicity I choose Cobb-Douglas production functions exhibiting constant returns to scale,
so that hr(p) = 0. The basic model is about preferences changing and so to abstract from
other diﬀerences between the two goods I make the two production technologies equally











0 < β < 1.
Let prt = pt and the price of one unit of wheat be the numeraire pwt = 1. Factors
earn marginal products in competitive equilibrium, resulting in the following factor pricing

































Factor clearing implies that all the labor in the economy is exhausted. Wages will be equal-
ized across both sectors as workers are mobile. By feeding in this factor clearing condition
I obtain relative prices as a function of the labor in each sector:








Utility is Cobb-Douglas and so budget shares are independent of prices. The budget share








7I provide a functional form for habit formation, where tastes for rice depend on the pre-
vious generations relative consumption of rice, but with a dampening parameter ν. This
determines how much tastes for rice respond to an increase in relative rice consumption:
tastesrt =
(rt−1)ν
(rt−1)ν + (wt−1)ν, ν > 0. (15)






wt = (1 − tastesrt)mt.
Because demand is homothetic, everyone in the economy spends the same proportion of their






(ωtL + πrtTr + πwtTw)
pt
. (16)
Now I solve for equilibrium prices and labor allocation in generation t by combining the



















These are the prices and labor allocation in generation t conditional on tastesrt. However
tastesrt is a function of the previous generation’s demands with habit formation. By feed-
ing the demands and prices in generation t − 1 into tastesrt =
(rt−1)ν
(rt−1)ν+(wt−1)ν, I obtain the







Solving for the steady state, I set tastesr = tastesrt = tastesr,t−1 and rearrange. Interior














The steady-state tastesrs are greater than a half, with tastes favoring rice consumption,
as long as Tr > Tw and βν < 1 (tastes do not respond excessively to relative consumption).
Therefore tastes develop for the relatively abundant (comparative advantage) good, r in this
example. This is hypothesis 1; tastes positively correlate with endowments. The steady
state price remains less than 1 if ν < 1.
8The local stability of the steady state without oscillation requires that 0 <
df(tastesr,t−1)
tastesr,t−1 < 1




























Additionally, there are two more unstable equilibria at tastesr,t−1 = 0 or tastesr,t−1 = 1.
The unstable nature of these two points can be seen from subtracting tastesr,t−1 from equa-
tion 17:











Therefore, for 0 < tastesr,t−1 < 1 (and the conditions Tr > Tw and βν < 1),














Accordingly, the two equilibria at tastesr,t−1 = 0 and tastesr,t−1 = 1 are unstable, and the
interior equilibrium at tastesrs is globally stable.
A suﬃcient condition for tastes to be correlated with endowments, a stable steady state
to exist and the steady state relative price of rice to be strictly less than 1 is ν < 1. This
rules out the possibility that preferences respond to past consumption to such a large degree
that they overturn the resource comparative advantage. In this case the high demand for
rice actually makes it relatively more expensive, but it continues to be consumed in ever
larger amounts. This is related to how much a consumer values variety, as with ν ≥ 1 tastes
increase to such an extent that they overwhelm the disutility from consuming a less varied
diet. In the empirical section I show that this assumption holds for India, as prices for a
food are relatively cheaper in regions where tastes are stronger for that food.
C.5.1 Caloric Impact of Trade Liberalization on Labor
I will now look at landless workers’ (owners of one unit of labor only) calorie consumption
both in the ﬁrst generation (the steady state without habit formation) and at the autarky
steady state with habit formation. One unit of each good provides one calorie. Therefore
total calories consumed, calories, equals r+w. Feeding the wage into the demand functions, I

















I diﬀerentiate caloric intake with respect to tastesrt. Caloric intake increases as tastes adjust
























1−β = pt < 1.
What happens to the caloric consumption of landless labor for the adult generation alive
at the time a small region at its autarky steady state, s, opens up to trade? The world price
favors wheat, p∗ > 1, and the small region is a price taker. The equalization of wages across
the two sectors pins down the relative labor allocation through equation 14. I denote the































I calculate the total caloric intakes before (caloriess) and after (calories∗
s) trade liberal-












































L )1−β + (1 − tastesrs)ββ(Tw
L )1−β − 1.









































I compare a society where habits favor the comparative advantage good with a society
where there are ﬁxed neutral preferences. To do this I feed in the neutral preferences,
10tastesr1 = tastesrs = 1
2, and calculate the change in caloric elasticity with respect to trade
liberalization as tastes for the comparative advantage good increase. This does not assume
that preferences evolve precisely as described in the previous section, only that they are

















I sign this expression when Tr > Tw and p∗ > ps, so the area has a comparative advantage in
its relatively abundant good r. Here tastesrs > 1
2 with habit formation. The standard case
is p∗ ≥ 1 > ps where the world is evenly endowed with the two factors or has a relatively
more of the factor required to produce good r. Both terms of equation 19 are negative (or
zero for the ﬁrst term if p∗ = 1). Therefore, the elasticity of caloric intake with respect to
trade liberalization is reduced when preferences develop to favor the comparative advantage
good.10 This is hypothesis 3 in the paper.
C.6 Welfare Implications of Model with Quality Improvements
The utility function can be rewritten as follows:





e r = Atr
2αt,
e w = Atw
2(1−αt).
The actual quantities of rice and wheat consumed are r and w, while e r and e w are the quality-
adjusted quantity consumed using the local technologies. This model is isomorphic to the
model where tastes change over generations. Here, relative technologies for converting raw
food ingredients into meals, αt and (1 − αt), respond to the previous generation’s physical
consumption in the same way tastes responded to past relative consumption. At is the ab-
solute technological progress in generation t.11 This model is discussed in section 2.5, and
since preferences are ﬁxed, welfare gains from trade can be evaluated.
Proceeding in the same way as above. I show that the welfare elasticity of trade liberaliza-
tion for landless labor decreases if transformation technologies favor the relatively abundant
10In the case ps < p∗ < 1, so that the area has a comparative advantage in rice but the world endowment
also favors the production of rice, the sign cannot be determined. The sign will generally be negative unless
p∗ is much smaller than 1 or the price change p∗ −ps is very small. In these cases the rice-loving preferences
that develop with habit formation are still more suited to world prices than the neutral preferences, and so
being less willing to substitute into the expensive calorie source (wheat) actually makes consumers better
oﬀ in caloric terms.
11Over generations there will be absolute utility gains as the transformation technologies improve. This
enters the utility function multiplicatively, while αt determines how those technology gains are shared
between the two goods. Since I am analyzing the instantaneous gains from trade upon liberalization, the
equivalent comparison to the case of habits and no habits becomes a situation where there is equal total
technological progress At, but it is either primarily focused on the more consumed good or shared evenly
between the two goods.
11comparative advantage good:
d(UW−UA)/UA





























L )1−β)αs((1 − αs)ββ(Tw
L )1−β)1−αs − 1.
The log change is a monotonic transform of UW−UA



























Therefore, if αs = 1
2, the counterfactual where local transformation technologies develop in-
dependent of relative consumption, this derivative is negative when Tr > Tw and p∗ > 1 > ps.
Increasing αs, so that transformation technologies favor the good made with the relatively
abundant factor, reduces the welfare elasticity of trade liberalization. This is the amended
hypothesis 3* in the paper.
C.7 A Parametrized Example with Non-Homothetic Preferences
In this section I relax the assumption of homothetic Cobb-Douglas preferences, and show
that for a simple two-period model with non-homothetic preferences, landless labor develops
the strongest preferences for the local comparative advantage food, and that at the time of
trade liberalization landless labor will lose in caloric terms, although the group would have
gained at the time of liberalization in a world without habit formation.
The production side is identical to the model outlined in section C.5.1, and so the fac-
tor pricing equations 9-12 and the factor clearing equation 13 continue to hold as before.
Similarly, tastes evolve as in equation 15. However, the product market clearing equation is
altered by assuming a more general demand speciﬁcation.
My demand speciﬁcation comes from the Almost Ideal Demand System used in the em-
pirical section of the paper (equation 3),




where m is factor income. The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation used above is a special case where
γ = b = 0.
12With Cobb-Douglas production functions, Melvin and Waschik (2001) show that labor’s welfare is
minimized at autarky prices, and so any price changes are welfare improving. However, here i show that
the welfare gain with trade is smaller in a world with habit formation. For other constant elasticity of
substitution production functions, Melvin and Waschik (2001) show that welfare losses for labor upon trade
liberalization are possible.
12I assume that a proportion φ of the population is landless, and posses only 1 unit of labor
each. The landowner population, (1−φ)L, possess one unit of labor and a proportion 1
(1−φ)L






(bsharert(ωt,.)ωtφL + bsharert(ωt + πrtTr+πwtTw
(1−φ)L ,.)(ωt(1 − φ)L + πrtTr + πwtTw)
pt
.
I can now solve for all the unknown variables in the ﬁrst period using the product market
clearing equation alongside equations 9-13, and feeding in tastesr1 = 1
2. I calculate tastes in
period 2 using equation 15, and then solve for the unknown variables in the second period
in a similar manner.
For a reasonable set of parameters,13 landless labor has stronger preferences for rice in the
second period, the food that the region has a comparative advantage at producing. Intu-
itively, as the landless are poorer than landowners, they consumed a proportionally larger
amount of the relatively cheap rice in the ﬁrst period. If trade liberalization with a world
that has a comparative advantage in wheat occurs during the second period, landless la-
bor will see their caloric consumption decline at the time of liberalization. However, in the
case of no habit formation (the equivalent to trade liberalization in the ﬁrst period when
tastesr1 = 1
2), landless labor would gain in caloric terms at the time of liberalization.
D Robustness Results
D.1 Robustness of Taste Estimates
There are several econometric reasons why the LA/AIDS taste estimates may be inconsis-
tent. The endogeneity of prices is a general issue in demand estimation, with the literature
highlighting diﬀerentiated products as a particular concern since these often have promotions
and quantity discounts (Dhar et al., 2003). As all the foods in the sample are raw agricultural
commodities, this should not be a substantial problem for rural India. My paper details how
tastes vary at the level of the agro-climatic region, and these regional taste diﬀerences are
picked up by the regional dummy variables. However, if tastes also vary at the village level
and village markets are not fully integrated within regions, village taste peculiarities will
change local demand and therefore local prices. Since I cannot include a village-level taste
dummy and village-level prices, this is a case of omitted variable bias.
To clarify the situation, I rewrite equation 4 by sweeping out the region dummies, and




γgg0 g lnpg0riv + e εgri, (20)













g lnpriv · e εgri. (21)
13These parameters are as follows: L = 10,Tw = 5,Tr = 15,ν = 0.8,β = 0.4,b = −0.1,α0 = 0.4,γ =
−0.3,P = 1.5,φ = 0.3.
13The price faced by all households i in village v is pg0riv.14 The G × 1 vector of the 52
coeﬃcients on prices, γgg0s, for the good g regression is γg. I deﬁne a region r average for a
generic variable xg0 as xg0r, a region demeaned variable e xg0ri = xg0ri−xg0r and a G×1 vector e xri
of the G variables e xg0ri for each household i. The estimated parameters from this regression
will be identical to those when the region eﬀects are included via the Frisch-Waugh theorem.
I can recover the ﬁxed eﬀects by using the OLS ﬁrst order conditions from regression 4:15




The village-level taste deviations (αgrv) for village v are the omitted variable and are mean
zero at the region level, e εgri = αgrv + e gri. The price is determined by equalizing village-level
aggregate supply ys
















In the equations above, zgrj is one producer j’s supply of good g, Zgr is the out-of-village
supply that increases with the village price pgrv and Ygr is the out-of-village demand that de-
creases with pgrv. E[g lnpgrivαgrv] > 0 since αgrv raises bsharegri, and so raises the equilibrium
price.
Instrumenting the 52 prices requires 52 instruments that are correlated with lnpgrv but
uncorrelated with αgrv. Hausman (1994) suggests using prices from other markets which
have been partly determined by the same supply shifters Zgr(pgrv) but are not correlated
with village tastes αgrv.16 Accordingly, I instrument each village price with the price in
a nearby village in the same district, which should be aﬀected by similar supply shocks.17
The main results are robust to using these instrumented taste measures and are reported
in tables D.1 through D.6.18 For these instrumented results to be consistent, village tastes
and hence deviations from regional average tastes cannot be spatially correlated. If they are,
14Only one of the village and household identiﬁers are necessary, and I will use only the village identiﬁer
when referring to village level supply and demand. Otherwise I use both identiﬁers on price terms.
15As shown by Kennan (1989), there may also be an additional bias in estimating γgg0 from individual
demand shocks, such as income, that does not disappear with aggregation. However this bias will become
small as long as there is a suﬃcient village level component to this individual shock.
16There has been a heated debate between Hausman and Bresnahan about the validity of these instru-
ments. Most of the discussion centers around whether such promotions as national advertising campaigns
shift tastes simultaneously across all markets. This is not an issue here as my food products are generally
undiﬀerentiated and I explicitly control for regional taste shifters.
17I instrument prices in the village with prices in the next village in the district according to the NSS
village number. For the highest numbered village in the district, I use prices in the lowest numbered village.
18There are 52 ﬁrst-stage regressions. These instruments may be somewhat weak. The average ﬁrst stage
F-stat is 13.6. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is 0.375 for the full ﬁrst-stage. Stock and Yogo
(2002) do not report critical values for more than 3 endogenous regressors.
14more distant prices may be suitable instruments, although these prices will also be much
more weakly correlated with village prices.
I can approach the endogeneity of prices in another way and avoid instrumentation alto-
gether. The bias in \ tastesgr should only increase the dispersion of the taste estimates and
not their rank ordering under certain conditions. I derive the bias by combining equation 21
and 22, where lnp is the G × R matrix of regional prices lnpg0r and tastesg is the R × 1
vector of regional tastes for good g:















g lnpriv · αgriv).
If this bias increases monotonically with tastesgr,
d( \ tastesgr−tastesgr)
dtastesgr > 0, then the rank order-
ing will remain unchanged. To proceed I simplify the problem further and assume that all
goods are substitutes, so that village-speciﬁc tastes for good g lower the price for good g0:
E[g lnpgrivαgrv] = c1 > 0,
E[g lnpg0rivαgrv] = c2 < 0.
I assume the variance-covariance matrix of region-demeaned prices is approximately diago-



























Finally, I replace lnpgr with its best linear predictor conditional upon regional tastes,
tastesgr. The theory of habit formation and regional endowments outlined in this paper, and
veriﬁed for India, provides signs for the taste terms. Strong regional tastes for food g are
associated with lower regional prices for that food (both are determined by endowments).
Similarly, strong regional tastes for good g are associated with higher prices for good g0, as
relative endowments are lower:




ψ1 < 0,ψ2 > 0.
Under the null hypothesis, tastes do not evolve through habit formation and are independent
of regional prices, ψ1 = ψ2 = 0. The estimates of regional tastes should then be zero and
unbiased.
With this simplifying structure in place I can calculate how the bias in \ tastesgr changes
15with the size of tastesgr:






The dispersion of the taste estimates increases if tastes vary at the village-level and mar-
kets within regions are not integrated, but the rank ordering of tastes remains unchanged.
Therefore, normalized taste measures across regions should still pick up the relative tastes
for food g. Normalized tastes were already used to test the prediction that tastes are posi-
tively correlated with endowments and negatively with prices. Results for regression 7 using
normalized tastes (mean 0 standard deviation 1) are shown in tables D.5 and D.6. Normal-
ization removes the relative importance of each good in caloric consumption (for example
changes in the rice price will have a larger impact on calories than changes in the price of black
pepper). Accordingly, instead of the summation measure, I use a correlation between normal-
ized tastes and price changes, weighted by the national budget shares19 for each good, ρT
r =
corrg(tastesgr,∆lnpgr). As before, the coeﬃcient on corrg(tastesgr,∆lnpgr) is negative.
Total food expenditure may also be correlated with the demand for individual foodstuﬀs.
Fortunately, I know how much the household spent on other expenditures and this allows
me to bound the bias. If food expenditure increases with higher demand for a food, other
expenditures will necessarily decline with a ﬁxed income, biasing the coeﬃcients in the other
direction. Therefore foodi can be instrumented with other expenditures, and the true co-
eﬃcients should lie somewhere between the uninstrumented and instrumented results. The
estimated coeﬃcients, shown in tables D.1 through D.6, are very similar, suggesting that the
endogeneity of food expenditure in the demand estimation is not a major concern. If the
measurement error in food and non-food expenditure is independent, this instrumentation
strategy also avoids biased parameters that would result from an imperfect measure of food
expenditure appearing both in the denominator of the food budget share and on the right
hand side of equation 4.
The γgg0 terms on prices may also vary by region and be correlated with taste diﬀerences.
This will lead to biased estimates of tastesgr as the region dummy absorbs the region speciﬁc




(γgg0r − γgg0)lnpg0r + νgri,




The population-averaged γgg0s are consistently estimated assuming the rank condition holds,
the mean zero error term νgri is strictly exogenous and E(γggr−γgg | ^ lnpgri) = 0 (Wooldridge,
19Results are unchanged if I use the national caloric share instead.
162005).20 However the tastesgr are still biased as they include the regional γgg0 deviation.
Allowing elasticities to vary by region substantially reduces the degrees of freedom in es-
timating equation 4 and asks too much of the limited village price variation within regions.
One possibility is to use the 38th and 50th thick rounds (1983 and 1993/4) to add extra
price variation. I assume tastes are constant over the short-run (10 years in this case) and
then estimate equation 4 on a region-by-region basis. Tables D.1 through D.6 show the
main regressions rerun using this measure of tastes as a further robustness check. While
allowing γgg0 to vary by region attenuates the coeﬃcients, the signs remain the same and the
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
It is also possible to make a similar argument to the one above, with regional variation in
γgg0 only increasing the dispersion of tastes but not changing their rank ordering. In this case,
I require
dγgg0r
dtastesgr > 0 and
dγggr
dtastesgr < 0 for
d( \ tastesgr−tastesgr)
dtastesgr > 0, so that the budget share spent
on good g increases when there are price rises in other goods and decreases when the price of
good g rises. If this is satisﬁed, by the same logic as I outlined above in the case of village-
speciﬁc tastes, the dispersion of tastes will increase but not the ranking despite γgg0 varying by
region, and therefore the normalized taste results shown in tables D.5 and D.6 should be valid.
D.2 Robustness of Regional Caloric Change Regression
There are several concerns regarding the parameters estimated by running regression 7. If
households reduce non-food expenditure in response to rising prices for more favored foods,
the caloric decline will be tempered. Table D.7 shows the results of rerunning regression 7,
but replacing ∆lnfoodr with the change in total expenditure on all goods, ∆lnexpenditurer.
The magnitude of the caloric reduction coming from tastes correlating with price changes
declines by about half as expenditure is partially reallocated towards food. However, condi-
tional upon total expenditure, caloric intake still declines with the correlation between tastes
and price changes.
The approximation used to obtain regression 7 assumed that budget shares were ﬁxed in
the short run. This ignores any income eﬀects that lower demand for inferior goods with low
prices per calorie. The omission is likely to reduce the coeﬃcient on ∆lnfoodr. Since tastes
are positively related to relative endowments,
P52
g=1tastesgr∆lnpgr will also be correlated
with the size of the income gains from price changes and may bias b1 downwards. The full
log linearization includes an additional term,
P52
g=1calsharegr∆lnbsharegr, which represents
the decline in calories from a shift in budget shares to more expensive calorie sources:
20The last assumption is that price deviations within regions are uncorrelated with diﬀerences in γgg0





























where calshareg is the share of good g in total caloric intake. This regression is run and the re-
sults presented in columns 2 and 5 of table D.7. The coeﬃcient on
P52
g=1tastesgr∆lnpgr actu-
ally becomes more negative, implying that the omission of the additional
P52
g=1 calsharegr∆lnbsharegr
term was not responsible for the negative coeﬃcient on b1.
As a further robustness check, I instrument for ∆lnfoodr with the log change in non-
food expenditure, ∆lnnon foodr. A shock that increases the demand for calories, such as
changing work patterns, will also aﬀect food expenditure and result in a positive correlation
between ∆lnfoodr and the error term, biasing b3 upwards. However, there will be a negative
or no correlation with ∆lnnon foodr, and the true value of b3 will be bounded between the
instrumented and uninstrumented estimates. These results are also shown in table D.7, and
b1 is essentially unchanged in the two speciﬁcations, implying that the endogeneity of food
expenditure is not a major problem.
18Figure D.1: The Predicted Caloric Losses from Liberalization and Regional Expenditure
For Subsample Consuming Fewer than 2000 Calories Per Person Per Day, Excluding Farmers
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19Table D.1: Robust Taste Estimates and Relative Resource Endowments I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
tastesgr
(Prod. (Value (Price (foodi (Regional (Hh. Price (Wage &
Endow.) Endow.) Instr.) Instr.) γgg0r) Interact.) Density)
endowmentgr 1.764** 1.824** 1.891 1.751*** 0.117** 1.736*** 1.700***
(0.71) (0.90) (1.17) (0.51) (0.058) (0.52) (0.65)
Observations 3000 1463 3375 3375 3278 3375 2385
Note: Dependent variable, tastes, estimated using the unexplained regional variation in food budget shares,
with common price and food expenditure controls. Independent variable, endowmentgr, predicted from re-
gressing observed relative endowments on agro-climatic endowments by crop using Limited Information Max-
imum Likelihood as in table 1. Production endowment (column 1) uses total production in tonnes rather
than are planted for relative endowment in ﬁrst stage. Value endowment (column 2) uses total value instead
of area planted. Price instruments (column 3) for taste estimation are prices for 52 goods in nearby village.
foodi instrument (column 4) for taste estimation is non-food expenditure. Regional γgg0r tastesgr (column 5)
are estimated by running LA/AIDS separately on each region. The household price interactions (column 6)
include interactions of all of the control variables with the own price term in the expenditure system. Agricul-
tural wage and population density (column 7) includes two additional endowments, the real agricultural wage
and the population density for the subset of regions covered by the India Agriculture and Climate Data Set.
Both tastes and observed relative endowments normalized mean 0, s.d. 1 by good. Robust standard errors. *
signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
Table D.2: Robust Taste Estimates and Relative Resource Endowments II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
tastesgr
Village Price: Mean Min Max 25th pctile. 75th pctile. Trans 1 Trans 2
endowmentgr 1.727*** 1.698*** 1.587*** 1.897*** 1.624*** 1.721*** 1.701***
(0.55) (0.47) (0.47) (0.67) (0.51) (0.56) (0.51)
Observations 3375 3375 3375 3375 3375 3375 3375
Note: Dependent variable, tastes, estimated using the unexplained regional variation in food budget shares, with
common price and food expenditure controls. Various village prices are used instead of the median price that is
used in the main speciﬁcation (mean, minimum, maximum, 25th percentile and 75th percentile of the reported
unit values, a unit price including a 5 percent ad-valorem transport cost when good is not available locally and
so nearby price used instead, trans1, and an ad-valorem transport cost based on sugar prices diﬀerences, trans 2).
endowmentgr are predicted values from regressing observed relative endowments on agro-climatic endowments by
crop using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood as in table 1. Both tastes and observed relative endowments
normalized mean 0, s.d. 1 by good. Robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
20Table D.3: Correlations Between Robust Taste Estimates and Prices I
Pearson’s product-moment correlation
Pricesgr [95 Percent Conf. Interval]
tastesgr (Prices Instrumented) -0.036** -0.069 -0.004
tastesgr (foodi Instrumented) -0.084*** -0.116 -0.051
tastesgr (Regional γgg0r) -0.027* -0.059 0.006
tastesgr (Hhold Price Interactions) -0.096*** -0.128 -0.064
Note: 3670 observations. Tastes estimated using the unexplained regional variation in food budget
shares, with common price and food expenditure controls. Price instruments for taste estimation are
prices for 52 goods in nearby village. foodi instrument for taste estimation is non-food expenditure.
Regional γgg0r tastesgr are estimated by running LA/AIDS separately on each region. The household
price interactions include interactions of all of the control variables with the own price term in the
expenditure system. Prices are regional median unit values. Both variables normalized mean 0,
s.d. 1 by good. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1. Conﬁdence intervals based on Fisher’s
transformation.
Table D.4: Correlations Between Robust Taste Estimates and Prices II
Pearson’s product-moment correlation
Pricesgr [95 Percent Conf. Interval]
tastesgr (Mean Village Price) -0.074*** -0.106 -0.041
tastesgr (Minimum Village Price) -0.139*** -0.171 -0.108
tastesgr (Maximum Village Price) -0.019 -0.052 0.013
tastesgr (25th Pctile. Village Price) -0.122*** -0.154 -0.090
tastesgr (75th Pctile. Village Price) -0.035** -0.670 -0.003
tastesgr (5 Percent Transport Cost) -0.054*** -0.086 -0.022
tastesgr (Sugar Price Transport Cost) -0.075*** -0.107 -0.043
Note: 3670 observations. Tastes estimated using the unexplained regional variation in food budget
shares, with common price and food expenditure controls. Various village prices are used instead of the
median price that is used in the main speciﬁcation (mean, minimum, maximum, 25th percentile and 75th
percentile of the reported unit values, a unit price including a 5 percent ad-valorem transport cost when a
good is not available locally and so a nearby price used instead, and a unit price including an ad-valorem
transport cost based on sugar prices diﬀerences). Regional prices are regional median unit values. Both
variables normalized mean 0, s.d. 1 by good. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1. Conﬁdence intervals
based on Fisher’s transformation.
21Table D.5: Caloric Change, Robust Taste Estimates and Temporal Price Changes (Unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)























(Hhold Price Interactions) (0.11)
52 P
g=1
hg(Pr,foodr)∆lnpgr -0.369*** -0.338** -0.335*** -0.102 -0.292**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (-1.09) (0.14)
∆lnfoodr 0.589*** 0.591*** 0.594*** 0.506*** 0.526*** 0.595***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (10.6) (0.047)
52 P
g=1
(Jgr − Jr)∆lnpgr 2.878 2.882* 2.806* 1.941 2.499 2.787*
(1.57) (1.58) (1.61) (1.47) (1.66) (1.60)
Constant -0.369*** -0.381*** -0.389*** -0.677*** -0.673*** -0.387***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.061) (-11.5) (0.11)
Observations 75 76 76 76 76 76
R2 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.55 0.54 0.58
Note: Dependent variable is the log change in caloric intake per person between 1987-88 and 2004-05. The
independent variables come from the log linearization of caloric intake. Jgr is the inverse relative price per
calorie. Tastes estimated using the unexplained regional variation in food budget shares, with common price
and food expenditure controls. Price instruments for taste estimation are prices for 52 goods in nearby village.
foodi instrument for taste estimation is non-food expenditure. Regional γgg0r tastesgr are estimated by running
LA/AIDS separately on each region. Normed tastes uses correlation between ∆lnpgr and tastes normalized
mean 0 s.d. 1 by good, with correlation weighted using national food budget shares for each good. Demeaned
price changes remove the region average price change from ∆lnpgr. The household price interactions include
interactions of all of the control variables with the own price term in the expenditure system. Robust standard
errors. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
22Table D.6: Caloric Change, Robust Taste Estimates and Temporal Price Changes (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)























(Hhold Price Interactions) (0.082)
52 P
g=1
hg(Pr,foodr)∆lnpgr -0.655*** -0.522*** -0.600*** -0.101 -0.567***
(0.094) (0.11) (0.088) (-1.17) (0.10)
∆lnfoodr 0.739*** 0.724*** 0.735*** 0.511*** 0.541*** 0.732***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (9.74) (0.049)
52 P
g=1
(Jgr − Jr)∆lnpgr 1.533 1.911* 1.858 1.173 1.261 1.943*
(1.17) (1.09) (1.20) (1.64) (0.68) (1.16)
Constant -0.248*** -0.290*** -0.255*** -0.665*** -0.679*** -0.259***
(0.074) (0.085) (0.080) (0.066) (-10.3) (0.078)
Observations 75 76 76 76 76 76
R2 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.56 0.59 0.71
Note: Dependent variable is the log change in caloric intake per person between 1987-88 and 2004-05. The
independent variables come from the log linearization of caloric intake. Jgr is the inverse relative price per
calorie. Tastes estimated using the unexplained regional variation in food budget shares, with common price
and food expenditure controls. Price instruments for taste estimation are prices for 52 goods in nearby village.
foodi instrument for taste estimation is non-food expenditure. Regional γgg0r tastesgr are estimated by running
LA/AIDS separately on each region. Normed tastes uses correlation between ∆lnpgr and tastes normalized
mean 0 s.d. 1 by good, with correlation weighted using national food budget shares for each good. Demeaned
price changes remove the region average price change from ∆lnpgr. The household price interactions include
interactions of all of the control variables with the own price term in the expenditure system. Regressions are
weighted by a region’s total survey weight. Robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
23Table D.7: Caloric Change, Tastes and Temporal Price Changes: Additional Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




tastesgr∆lnpgr -0.146 -0.428*** -0.324** -0.335*** -0.730*** -0.581***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.093) (0.11)
52 P
g=1
hg(Pr,foodr)∆lnpgr -0.0693 -0.372** -0.270* -0.309** -0.725*** -0.545***





∆lnfoodr (Instrumented 0.547*** 0.710***
with ∆lnnonfoodr) (0.13) (0.12)
52 P
g=1
(Jgr − Jr)∆lnpgr 2.649* 2.304 2.768* 2.154 1.685* 1.972*





Constant -0.427*** -0.314*** -0.363*** -0.315** -0.158* -0.255***
(0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.084) (0.080)
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
R2 0.37 0.63 0.58 0.45 0.76 0.71
Note: Dependent variable is the log change in caloric intake per person between 1987-88 and 2004-05. The independent
variables come from the log linearization of caloric intake. Jgr is the inverse relative price per calorie. Tastes estimated
using the unexplained regional variation in food budget shares, with common price and food expenditure controls.
∆lnfoodr instrumented by two stage least squares using ∆lnnonfoodr in columns 3 and 6, with a ﬁrst stage F-stat
of 14.35 and 16.74 respectively. Regressions are weighted by a region’s total survey weight where indicated. Robust
standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
24Table D.8: Table of Means for Migrants and Non-Migrants
Variable Full Sample Wife Move Sample Wife Move 2 Sample
Non-Mig Migrant Non-Mig Migrant Non-Mig Migrant
Calories 2160.7 2228.8 2194.3 2222.8 2194.8 2257.7
(Per Person Per Day) (4.2) (34.0) (5.6) (18.3) (5.8) (22.1)
Food Expenditure 99.7 128.7 96.2 119.0 94.5 109.7
(Monthly Rupees/Person) (0.3) (1.8) (0.4) (1.5) (0.4) (1.7)
ln(Food Expenditure) 4.494 4.706 4.465 4.655 4.450 4.580
(Monthly Rupees/Person) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.014)
Total Expenditure 171.6 258.1 162.2 229.0 156.6 196.0
(Monthly Rupees/Person) (0.7) (4.9) (1.0) (7.8) (0.8) (3.8)
Years Since Moved 21.1 20.1 21.3 21.1
for Marriage (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3)
Age of Household Head 44.7 44.0 44.1 43.7 44.2 44.1
(0.1) (0.2 (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.4)
Illiterate 0.49 0.32 0.49 0.36 0.51 0.43
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Above Primary 0.20 0.37 0.19 0.34 0.17 0.28
Education (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Household Size 6.37 6.17 6.64 6.64 6.68 6.89
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02 (0.09) (0.02) (0.11)
Rural Household 0.80 0.47 0.86 0.57 0.88 0.71
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 115,069 9,898 49,431 3,868 44,945 2,565
Note: Means of non-migrant and migrant households from 1987-1988 NSS survey. For wife move samples,
migrants are wives who moved inter-state, as opposed to intra-state, at the time of marriage separately from
their husbands. Wife Move 2 sample only includes wives who moved to their husband’s village of birth. Standard
errors in parentheses. All means survey weighted.
25Table D.9: Comparing Bundles of Migrants and Non-Migrants (Reporting Controls)
(1) (2) (3)
ρiods = corrg(bshareig,bsharesg)
Full Sample Wife Move Wife Move 2
Idestination=s -0.458*** -1.026*** -1.009***
(0.085) (0.10) (0.11)
Idestination=s,origin6=s -0.0451*** -0.0425*** -0.0316***
(0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0071)
Idestination6=s -0.786*** -1.382*** -1.367***
(0.085) (0.10) (0.11)
Idestination6=s,origin=s 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.127***
(0.0040) (0.0063) (0.0077)
Idestination6=s,nearby=s 0.181*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0021)
lnfood 0.493*** 0.731*** 0.725***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.047)
lnfood2 -0.0479*** -0.0733*** -0.0725***
(0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0051)
age household head 0.000813** 0.00656*** 0.00624***
(0.00033) (0.00067) (0.00070)
age household head2 -0.00000608* -0.00000601 -0.00000409
(0.0000034) (0.0000054) (0.0000056)
age spouse -0.00354*** -0.000757 -0.000519
(0.00081) (0.0013) (0.0014)
adult males -0.00659*** -0.00642***
(0.00041) (0.00043)
adult females 0.00507*** 0.00464*** 0.00461***
(0.00086) (0.0013) (0.0014)
children -0.0000212 -0.000431 -0.000485
(0.00051) (0.00072) (0.00075)
head literate (≤ primary) 0.0377*** 0.0372*** 0.0372***
(0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0029)
head > primary educ. 0.0317*** 0.0391*** 0.0416***
(0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0035)
urban-urban mig. -0.00856*** -0.0194*** -0.0261***
(0.0033) (0.0051) (0.0057)
rural-urban mig. -0.0181*** 0.00600 -0.000791
(0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0054)
urban-rural mig. -0.0458*** -0.0355*** -0.0416***
(0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0065)
Observations 3,864,925 1,637,916 1,472,531
R2 0.77 0.76 0.75
Note: Dependent variable is the correlation between household food budget shares and mean shares
for state s (31 observations per hhold). Independent variables are indicators for origin o and current d
state. Constant, religion, caste, household type and subround dummies not shown. Robust standard
errors. All regressions survey weighted and clustered further at individual household. * signiﬁcant
at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
26Table D.10: Caloric Intake of Migrants Compared to Non-Migrants (Reporting Controls)
(1) (2) (3)
Daily Calories Per Person caloriesi (Full Sample)








lntotal expenditure 2 67.34***
(23.8)
age household head 9.707*** 18.30*** 22.51***
(0.94) (1.23) (1.40)
age household head2 -0.0957*** -0.156*** -0.169***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
adult males 10.02*** 5.510** 19.44***
(2.10) (2.60) (3.16)
adult females 1.072 -0.398 -19.06***
(4.26) (2.78) (3.43)
children -6.115 -35.55*** -106.1***
(5.22) (1.73) (2.16)
head literate (≤ primary) -69.61*** -37.71*** 110.2***
(5.29) (8.26) (9.59)
head > primary educ. -261.3*** -153.8*** 257.4***
(35.8) (10.2) (9.21)
urban-urban mig. -440.6*** -400.7*** -170.2***
(26.2) (12.2) (12.5)
rural-urban mig. -290.3*** -276.8*** -114.0***
(10.4) (16.5) (17.7)
urban-rural mig. -39.81*** -41.61*** 8.542
(11.9) (13.9) (16.3)
Observations 124,578 124,578 124,578
R2 0.50 0.29 0.10
Note: Daily calories per person regressed on an inter-state migrant dummy that takes the value 1
if either the household head or his spouse migrated from another state. Constant, religion, caste,
household type, subround and origin-state dummies not shown. Robust standard errors. All regressions
survey weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
27Table D.11: Caloric Intake of Intra-State and Inter-State Wife Households (Reporting Controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Daily Calories Per Person caloriesi
Wife Move Sample Wife Move 2 Sample
migranti -115.0*** -99.16*** 21.91 -257.3*** -43.87** -43.02** 35.72 -140.8***
(17.0) (17.1) (18.7) (33.05) (18.2) (18.7) (22.3) (37.82)
lnfood -3787*** -3794*** -3959*** -3957***
(588) (588.0) (630) (630.0)
lnfood2 585.8*** 586.7*** 609.6*** 609.4***













children -12.10*** -33.88*** -102.0*** -13.59*** -12.06*** -33.03*** -100.0*** -12.70***
(2.02) (2.12) (2.63) (2.000) (2.08) (2.20) (2.72) (2.089)
migranti× 27.55*** 17.39**
children (7.992) (8.606)
age head 9.576*** 14.06*** 21.09*** 9.952*** 9.862*** 14.01*** 20.91*** 10.34***
(1.37) (1.62) (2.09) (1.364) (1.43) (1.69) (2.17) (1.427)
age head2 -0.114*** -0.148*** -0.179*** -0.124*** -0.115*** -0.145*** -0.175*** -0.124***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.0130) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.0135)
age spouse 2.652*** 3.845*** 3.022*** -1.102 2.425*** 3.217*** 2.555** -0.526
(0.69) (0.86) (1.12) (0.823) (0.73) (0.89) (1.17) (0.858)
adult males 7.021** 7.848** 24.31*** 7.959*** 4.504 6.224 25.32*** 5.533*
(3.08) (3.86) (4.89) (3.078) (3.18) (4.02) (5.08) (3.183)
adult females 2.833 -2.653 -9.414* -11.99*** 0.157 -3.579 -8.098 -13.68***
(3.17) (3.99) (5.08) (3.615) (3.28) (4.10) (5.32) (3.751)
literate ≤ -66.96*** -50.05*** 99.15*** -68.59*** -70.40*** -51.32*** 98.78*** -72.03***
primary (6.41) (7.89) (9.95) (6.372) (6.71) (8.15) (10.4) (6.664)
> primary -215.1*** -145.7*** 248.1*** -215.7*** -210.2*** -148.8*** 237.3*** -211.6***
educ. (12.2) (12.5) (12.5) (12.18) (12.6) (13.2) (13.3) (12.70)
urban-urban -486.8*** -455.1*** -177.0*** -476.2*** -456.5*** -430.0*** -198.9*** -450.1***
mig. (16.6) (18.5) (17.7) (16.45) (17.1) (18.8) (19.3) (17.07)
rural-urban -287.9*** -264.0*** -112.1*** -281.8*** -241.3*** -219.3*** -109.2*** -238.2***
mig. (11.5) (13.5) (15.2) (11.48) (12.1) (14.5) (16.4) (12.10)
urban-rural -61.85*** -51.77*** 7.354 -58.63*** -79.22*** -55.41*** -1.979 -75.60***
mig. (12.4) (15.3) (19.0) (12.32) (13.7) (16.7) (21.9) (13.57)
Observations 52,836 52,836 52,836 52,800 47,501 47,501 47,501 47,465
R2 0.66 0.45 0.14 0.66 0.67 0.47 0.14 0.67
Note: Daily calories per person regressed on an inter-state wife dummy, migranti, and the years since moving with
an interaction for being an inter-state wife. Wife Move 2 sample only includes wives who moved to their husband’s
village of birth. Constant, religion, caste, household type, subround and origin-state dummies not shown. Robust
standard errors. All regressions survey weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
28Table D.12: Caloric Intake of Migrants Compared to Non-Migrants (Destination-State-Sector Controls)
(1) (2) (3)
Daily Calories Per Person caloriesi
Destination-State-Sector Dummies Only Also Including Origin-State Dummies
Full Sample Wife Move Wife Move 2 Full Sample Wife Move Wife Move 2
migranti -69.90*** -84.40*** -31.42* -70.90*** -80.20*** -28.11
(13.99) (15.42) (17.08) (16.76) (15.81) (17.46)
lnfood -2780*** -3755*** -3966*** -2788*** -3769*** -3968***
(960.2) (585.0) (630.3) (962.0) (585.3) (630.5)
lnfood2 479.1*** 582.3*** 610.7*** 480.2*** 584.2*** 611.1***
(114.3) (66.78) (72.24) (114.6) (66.82) (72.26)
age household 9.737*** 9.892*** 10.06*** 9.711*** 9.880*** 10.07***
head (0.932) (1.366) (1.432) (0.930) (1.363) (1.430)
age household -0.0971*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.0969*** -0.113*** -0.115***
head2 (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0109) (0.0129) (0.0135)
age spouse 2.033*** 2.111*** 2.065*** 2.096***
(0.688) (0.720) (0.687) (0.719)
adult males 10.95*** 7.553** 4.387 11.03*** 7.695** 4.443
(2.061) (3.068) (3.179) (2.060) (3.062) (3.182)
adult females -0.941 2.381 0.947 -0.639 2.558 1.006
(3.943) (3.128) (3.260) (4.069) (3.128) (3.261)
children -6.262 -11.72*** -11.85*** -6.337 -11.80*** -11.84***
(5.464) (2.028) (2.085) (5.422) (2.022) (2.085)
head literate -68.99*** -65.24*** -70.07*** -68.70*** -65.26*** -69.94***
(≤ primary) (5.676) (6.349) (6.675) (5.715) (6.354) (6.682)
head > -268.1*** -224.9*** -218.7*** -267.3*** -224.2*** -217.9***
primary educ. (36.80) (12.29) (12.78) (36.52) (12.27) (12.78)
rural household -113.5 753.8*** -899.1 -8.194 1336*** -974.1
(92.23) (22.59) (720.7) (139.6) (155.6) (736.3)
Observations 124967 53335 47547 124967 53335 47547
R2 0.500 0.662 0.670 0.501 0.663 0.671
Note: Daily calories per person regressed on an inter-state migrant dummy. Constant, religion, caste, household type,
subround, origin-state and destination-state-sector dummies not shown. Sector is either rural or urban. Robust standard
errors. All regressions survey weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
29Table D.13: Caloric Change and the Correlation of Tastes with Spatial Price
Changes (Reporting Controls)
(1) (2) (3)
Daily Calories Per Person caloriesi
Full Sample Wife Move Sample Wife Move 2 Sample
52 P
g=1
tastesgo∆lnpgod -0.873*** -0.705*** -0.560***
×migranti (0.0598) (0.0672) (0.0841)
52 P
g=1
hgo(Po,foodo)∆lnpgod -0.864*** -0.759*** -0.733***
×migranti (0.0713) (0.0946) (0.127)
52 P
g=1
(Jgo − Jo)∆lnpgod -2.924* -6.597*** -9.597***
×migranti (1.765) (2.075) (2.598)
migranti -0.0209*** -0.00127 0.0200**
(0.00703) (0.00697) (0.00820)
lnfood 1.692*** 1.242*** 1.257***
(0.0746) (0.105) (0.111)
lnfood2 -0.111*** -0.0665*** -0.0677***
(0.00814) (0.0113) (0.0120)
age household head 0.00668*** 0.00514*** 0.00527***
(0.000409) (0.000575) (0.000593)
age household head2 -6.32e-05*** -5.75e-05*** -5.70e-05***
(4.13e-06) (5.16e-06) (5.33e-06)
age spouse 0.00114*** 0.000875***
(0.000300) (0.000304)
adult males 0.00322*** 0.00285** 0.00257*
(0.000949) (0.00132) (0.00138)
adult females 0.000893 0.000526 -0.000688
(0.00101) (0.00135) (0.00140)
children -0.00376*** -0.00676*** -0.00670***
(0.000596) (0.000752) (0.000770)
head literate (≤ -0.0386*** -0.0341*** -0.0341***
primary)
(0.00216) (0.00285) (0.00293)
head > primary educ. -0.0877*** -0.0735*** -0.0720***
(0.00296) (0.00352) (0.00369)
urban-urban mig. -0.183*** -0.188*** -0.183***
(0.00415) (0.00558) (0.00621)
rural-urban mig. -0.137*** -0.122*** -0.105***
(0.00452) (0.00487) (0.00519)
urban-rural mig. -0.0265*** -0.0258*** -0.0381***
(0.00498) (0.00550) (0.00607)
Observations 124578 52812 47482
Origin-Destination Pairs 484 341 256
R2
0.722 0.695 0.699
Note: Dependent variable is the log of caloric intake per person. Tastes estimated using un-
explained state variation in food budget shares, with common price and expenditure controls
(LA/AIDS). Jgr is the inverse relative price per calorie. Constant, religion, caste, household type,
subround and origin-state dummies not shown. Robust standard errors. All regressions survey
weighted. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** 5, *** 1.
30Table D.14: Caloric Change and the Correlation Between Tastes and Temporal Price
Changes for Richer and Poorer Regions
(1) (2)
∆lncaloriesr 1987-88 to 2004-05



















Note: Dependent variable is the log change in caloric intake per person between 1987-88 and 2004-05.
The independent variables come from the log linearization of caloric intake. Jgr is the inverse relative
price per calorie. Regressions are weighted by a region’s total survey weight. The sample is split by a
region’s average monthly per-capita expenditure in 1987/88. Robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10
percent, ** 5, *** 1.
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